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Article 4

Moral Conflict and Liberty:
Gay Rights and Religion
Chai R. Feldblum †
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine that you and your same-sex male partner got
married last year in Massachusetts and are now planning a
delayed honeymoon in Tennessee. You search the Web and
find a lovely guesthouse in your price range. Nothing about the
guesthouse’s description on the Web site makes you think you
will not be welcome there. You make reservations through the
Web site.
The two of you arrive at the guesthouse, sporting your
wedding rings and calling each other “honey.” The owner of
the guesthouse asks if you are gay. You answer that you are
and explain that this is your delayed honeymoon. The owner is
very gracious and courteous, but explains that you cannot stay
in his guesthouse unless you agree to sleep in separate rooms
and also agree not to engage in any sexual activity during your
stay. He explains that his religion requires that he “love the
sinner, but hate the sin.” For this reason, you are welcome to
stay at his guesthouse, but only if you do not use his facilities
to carry out sinful activities.
The owner also gives you a list of guesthouses in town
that do allow gay couples to stay in the same room. And, he
†
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. A version of this
paper was first delivered at Brooklyn Law School as part of the Symposium on Justice
Blackmun and Judicial Biography in September 2005. A subsequent version of the
paper was presented during a meeting hosted by the Becket Fund in December 2005.
The Becket Fund meeting was expressly designed to consider the impact that legal
recognition of civil marriage for same-sex couples might have on religious people. See
Scholars’ Conference on Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty, http://www.becket
fund.org/index.php/article/494.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). Preparing a paper for
that meeting both gave me an opportunity, and forced me, to engage with an issue that
I had considered only briefly in previous scholarship. I benefited greatly from
questions and comments in both venues. This article appears in this law review and,
with some revisions, it will appear in a book of the various papers delivered at the
Becket Fund meeting. I am indebted to the research assistance of Amy Simmerman
and Alyssa Rayman-Read.
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quickly assures you, he has checked and there is no law that
prohibits him from treating you in this way.
Let us assume that all the other guesthouses are full, so
you decide to stay at the original guesthouse, under the owner’s
rules. No one can claim that the guesthouse’s rules prohibit
you from “being gay.” Your identity as a gay person does not
disappear simply because you have not been able to engage in
the conduct of having sex with your same-sex partner over one
weekend. But it would be foolish to imagine that one’s identity
as a gay person would have any real meaning if one was
consistently precluded from having sex with one’s same-sex
partner. This identity—this identity liberty, as I hope to
explain below—is necessarily curtailed by the absence of a law
that prohibits public accommodations from discriminating
against you on the basis of sexual orientation.
Now imagine that you and your opposite-sex wife have
decided to open a Christian bed and breakfast. You view your
guesthouse as a haven for God-fearing, evangelical Christians.
You do not advertise generally on the Web, only on Christian
sites. You make it very clear in all your advertisements that
you run a Christian business and that you will not rent rooms
to cohabiting, homosexual couples (married or not) or to
cohabiting, heterosexual couples who are not married. One day
you are sued because your state has a law prohibiting
discrimination based on marital status and sexual orientation.
The court rules that the law places no burden on your religious
beliefs because your religion does not require you to operate a
guesthouse. You are ordered to change your guesthouse’s
rules.
No one can claim that the court order prohibits you from
“being religious.” The court has explained that you may
continue to hold whatever beliefs you want about sexual
practices. You simply may not impose your beliefs on others.
However, you feel it is foolish to imagine that your beliefs and
identity as a religious person can be disaggregated from your
conduct. Your religious belief—your belief liberty interest, as I
hope to explain below—is necessarily curtailed by the existence
of a law that prohibits you from discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation or marital status.
We tend not to think of these conflict situations in the
language of conflicting liberties, and certainly not in the
language of liberties that have something in common, even as
they conflict.
Those who advocate for laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation tend to talk
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simply about “equality.” Those who seek to stop such laws
from coming into existence, or who seek religious exemptions
from these laws, tend to talk about “morality” and/or “religious
freedom.” These groups tend to talk past each other, rather
than with each other.
My goal in this piece is to surface some of the
commonalities between religious belief liberty and sexual
orientation identity liberty and to offer some public policy
suggestions for what to do when these liberties conflict. I first
want to make transparent the conflict that I believe exists
between laws intended to protect the liberty of lesbian, gay,
bisexual and transgender (“LGBT”) people so that they may
live lives of dignity and integrity and the religious beliefs of
some individuals whose conduct is regulated by such laws. I
believe those who advocate for LGBT equality have
downplayed the impact of such laws on some people’s religious
beliefs and, equally, I believe those who have sought religious
exemptions from such civil rights laws have downplayed the
impact that such exemptions would have on LGBT people.
Second, I want to suggest that the best framework for
dealing with the conflict between some people’s religious beliefs
and LGBT people’s identity liberty is to analyze religious
people’s claims as belief liberty interests under the Due Process
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, rather than
as free exercise claims under the First Amendment. There
were important historical reasons for including the First
Amendment in our Constitution, with its dual Free Exercise
and Establishment Clauses. 1 But the First Amendment need
not be understood as the sole source of protection for religious
people when the claims they raise also implicate the type of
liberty interests that can legitimately be considered under the
Due Process Clauses of our Constitution. 2
1
See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947) (discussing these
historical reasons, including the early Americans’ desire to escape the “bondage” of
European laws that compelled citizens to attend and support government-favored
religions, and the colonial governments’ practice of taxing citizens to pay for, among
other things, ministers’ salaries and the construction of churches).
2
As a practical matter, of course, current constitutional doctrine would
provide minimal protection to any individual who experienced a civil rights law as
burdening his or her religious beliefs or practices. Under the Supreme Court’s decision
in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), a neutral law that burdens
religious beliefs will be sustained as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental purpose. But the catalyst for my argument is not the strategic one of
offering religious people a “second bite at the apple” post-Smith. Rather, as I hope to
make clear in this article, I believe it is simply more appropriate to analyze religious
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My argument in this article is that intellectual
coherence and ethical integrity demand that we acknowledge
that civil rights laws can burden an individual’s belief liberty
interest when the conduct demanded by these laws burdens an
individual’s core beliefs, whether these beliefs are religiously
based or secularly based. Acknowledging such a liberty
interest will not necessarily result in the invalidation of the
law or the granting of an exemption for the religious
individual. Rather, as I hope to demonstrate below, Justice
Souter’s concurrence in Washington v. Glucksberg 3 offers us a
useful approach for engaging in the required substantive due
process analysis, in a manner that provides us with a means of
seriously considering the liberty interest at stake without
necessarily invalidating the law burdening that interest.
Finally, I offer my own assessment of how these
conflicts might be resolved in our democratic system. I have no
illusions that either LGBT rights advocates or religious
freedom advocates will decide I have offered the correct
resolution. But my primary goal in this piece is simply to
argue that this conflict needs to be acknowledged in a respectful
manner by both sides, and then addressed through the
legislative processes of our democratic system. Whether my
particular resolution is ultimately accepted feels less important
to me than helping to foster a fruitful conversation about
possible resolutions. 4
belief claims as liberty claims, and not to elevate religious beliefs over other deeply
held beliefs derived from sources other than religion.
3
521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring).
4
Among the law review articles and notes that have been written on this
issue (all from the perspective of free exercise claims), some have suggested a balancing
of interests, while others have focused on justifying either the religious interest or the
non-discrimination perspective. Surprisingly to me, I found a limited number of articles
on the subject overall. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church:
Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 393, 438, 444 (1994) (arguing that anti-discrimination legislation based on
sexual orientation is not a compelling interest like gender or race because
homosexuality is still “morally controversial” and government should not legislate a
particular view of sexual morality); Marie A. Failinger, Remembering Mrs. Murphy: A
Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and Religious
Landlords, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 425-28 (2001) (proposing a remedies approach
under which a landlord would be held liable for discrimination based on religious
beliefs, but under which damages would be limited, so as to recognize and honor the
landlord’s religious beliefs, discourage frivolous claims challenging those religious
beliefs, and strike a balance between the parties’ “consciences”); Harlan Loeb & David
Rosenberg, Fundamental Rights in Conflict: The Price of a Maturing Democracy, 77
N.D. L. REV. 27, 49 (2001) (suggesting individual religious-based exemptions that could
be overridden by a state’s compelling interest in limited circumstances); Maureen E.
Markey, The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA World, 29
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When I delivered this paper as a talk during the
symposium on the judicial biography of Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, I titled it: We Love You Anyway/We Love You:
Justice Blackmun, Gay Rights and Religion. The phrase “We
love you anyway/We love you” came from Justice Blackmun’s
response to me when I informed him I was a lesbian. As I
explain below, the difference in meaning between those two
responses can help illuminate the conflict that arises between
some people’s religious liberty and LGBT people’s full liberty
rights.
But to begin in the spirit of judicial biography, I want to
consider Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick 5
and, in particular, his reaction to the responses he received to
that dissent. In her book Becoming Justice Blackmun, Linda
Greenhouse eloquently documents how the public response to
Roe v. Wade 6 impacted Justice Blackmun’s views on women’s
rights. 7 I believe the responses the Justice received to his
dissent in Hardwick had a similar impact on his subsequent
views on gay rights.

RUTGERS L.J. 487, 549-52 (1998) (suggesting proposals for a modification or
replacement of the compelling state interest test in free exercise cases that have the
hallmarks of voluntary commercial activity and third party harm); Maureen E.
Markey, The Price of Landlord’s “Free” Exercise of Religion: Tenant’s Right to
Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 702-03 (1995)
(arguing against individual religious-based exemptions from civil rights laws because
allowing free exercise claims to trump civil rights laws could be the death knell for civil
rights); Stephanie Hammond Knutson, Note, The Religious Landlord and the Conflict
Between Free Exercise Rights and Housing Discrimination Laws—Which Interest
Prevails?, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 1669, 1726-31 (1996) (noting difficulty in weighing civil
rights interests and religious interests and proposing a religious exemption for small
landlords); Alvin C. Lin, Note, Sexual Orientation Antidiscrimination Laws and the
Religious Liberty Protection Act: The Pitfalls of the Compelling State Interest Inquiry,
89 GEO. L.J. 719, 748-51 (2001) (arguing against individual religious-based exemptions
from civil rights laws because they inject a troubling “morality” inquiry into civil rights
laws that are not based on morality concerns); Shelley K. Wessels, Note, The Collision
of Religious Exercise and Governmental Nondiscrimination Policies, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1201, 1231 (1989) (urging protection for religious groups when the group looks
“inward” to itself as a religious community, but not when the group “turns outwards” in
providing services to others in the community).
5
478 U.S. 186, 199-214 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting), overruled by
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
6
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 207-27 (2005).
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In Hardwick, a 5-4 decision written by Justice Byron
White, the Court ruled that the federal constitutional right of
privacy did not prohibit the State of Georgia from criminalizing
the sexual act of sodomy. 8 This decision was a huge blow to
gay rights advocates across the country. In a folder containing
Justice Blackmun’s materials on the Hardwick case, he saved
copies of several articles from the New York Times and the
Washington Post, with headlines like “Friend and Foe See
Homosexual Defeat” and “Sodomy Ruling’s Implications
Extend Far Beyond Bedroom.” 9
The Hardwick case was argued on March 31, 1986.
From about mid-May on, I awaited the decision with tension
and anticipation. At the time, I was clerking for Judge Frank
M. Coffin, who sat on the First Circuit Court of Appeals and
whose chambers were in Portland, Maine. I was scheduled to
begin my clerkship with Justice Harry A. Blackmun in July
1986. So, starting in mid-May, I would call the Supreme
Court’s public number every Monday morning to find out if the
Hardwick decision had been handed down—to find out whether
it would be a huge step forward or backward for gay rights and
to find out how my soon-to-be new boss had voted in the case.
I remember clearly when I heard the news of the
decision. Like so many others, I was upset and distraught by
8

478 U.S. at 189. As Justice White described the case:

This case does not require a judgment on whether laws against sodomy
between consenting adults in general, or between homosexuals in particular,
are wise or desirable. It raises no question about the right or propriety of
state legislative decisions to repeal their laws that criminalize homosexual
sodomy, or of state-court decisions invalidating those laws on state
constitutional grounds.
The issue presented is whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in
sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States that still make
such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long time.
Id. at 190.
9
Larry Rohter, Friend and Foe See Homosexual Defeat, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
1986, at A19 (‘‘‘It’s a major disaster from our point of view,’ said Thomas Stoddard,
executive director of the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, a leading
homosexual advocacy group. ‘For the gay rights movement, this is our Dred Scott case,’
he said referring to the 1857 Supreme Court ruling upholding slavery in which blacks
were held not to be citizens.”); Ruth Marcus, Sodomy Ruling’s Implications Extend Far
Beyond Bedroom, WASH. POST, July 2, 1986, at A1 (“The court’s decision ‘will not doom
every gay-rights case in every context in the future,’ said Nan Hunter of the American
Civil Liberties Union. But, she said, ‘the preservation of the sodomy laws provides an
excuse for the courts to invoke when we have successfully proved that there is no nexus
between homosexuality and job performance, or between homosexuality and parenting
ability . . . . Even though there is little criminal prosecution, the sodomy laws are
invoked frequently.’” (alteration in original)).
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the outcome. But I was elated that the Justice I was to work
for had dissented. And not only had he dissented, but as I read
the opinion a few days later, he had authored what I viewed as
a ringing endorsement of equality and protection for gay
people. I was off to work for my champion!
I began work at the Supreme Court in July 1986.
Although I had self-identified as a bisexual for the previous six
years (and had been open about my sexual orientation with
Judge Coffin and my co-clerks in that chambers), I held off
saying anything about my sexual orientation for the first few
weeks. And as July and August progressed, I became even
more reticent.
My hesitation had everything to do with my observation
of the way Justice Blackmun reacted to the reactions to his
dissent.
The Justice’s dissent in Hardwick had included several
eloquent and thoughtful statements about gay people. For
example:
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual
intimacy is “a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central
to family life, community welfare, and the development of human
personality.” The fact that individuals define themselves in a
significant way through their intimate sexual relationships with
others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be
many “right” ways of conducting those relationships, and that much
of the richness of a relationship will come from the freedom an
individual has to choose the form and nature of these intensely
personal bonds. 10

Reading an affirming statement such as this, in a
Supreme Court opinion no less, was an incredible experience
for many gay people. In reaction, gay men and lesbians across
the country poured out their gratitude, and often their stories,
in letters to the Justice. Justice Blackmun read every piece of
mail he received and he responded to a fair percentage of that
mail. He also reported on many of these letters during his
daily breakfasts with us, his four new clerks.
Watching Justice Blackmun respond to these letters
was a fascinating, and yet sobering, experience for me. I
realized that while the Justice had put his name on eloquent
statements about gay people that had warmed my heart (and
the hearts of so many others), he had not necessarily
experienced those same statements on an emotional plane. For
10

Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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that reason, the stark (and sometimes heart-wrenching)
emotion that came through these letters sometimes, I think,
simply bemused the Justice.
Ultimately, I believe the honesty and intense emotion of
these letters opened Justice Blackmun’s eyes to the daily
injustices faced by gay people across the country and
radicalized him in a way that simply thinking about the legal
question of the scope of privacy for sodomy could not. But
Justice Blackmun’s initial reaction to the deluge of letters was
mostly to marvel at how many gay people there seemed to be
out there. He was even more amazed when he found out that
he actually knew some of them. I vividly remember one
breakfast at which Justice Blackmun reported receiving a
letter the previous day from the son of a close friend. In the
letter, the young man told him he was gay and went on at
length to explain how personally important Justice Blackmun’s
dissent in Hardwick had been for him. Although the Justice
was clearly moved by this letter, he was also clearly astonished
that this “lovely young man” was “a homosexual.” Indeed, he
confided in us, he wasn’t sure the young man’s father knew yet
that his son was a homosexual.
Listening to Justice Blackmun during those first few
months made me decide to closet my own sexual orientation. It
was not that I feared overt discrimination by the Justice. I did
not. But I did fear and shrink from his overt discomfort. It
was clear to me that the Justice was not comfortable with
“homosexuals” (as he called them), despite his strong support
for their right of privacy. And, indeed, as I would come to see
when I taught Justice Blackmun’s Hardwick dissent in my
Sexual Orientation and the Law class several years later, some
of that discomfort is evident in the opinion itself. 11
So I chose the comfort and ease of the closet, as so many
of us who do not otherwise defy gender stereotypes are able to
do. I did not feel particularly good about it, but I also did not
feel that I needed to “educate” my Justice any further by
coming out. 12
11

See infra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
The irony of my closeting myself was, nevertheless, apparent to me each
time Justice Blackmun told us how astonishing it was that Justice Powell had confided
in him the previous term that he (Justice Powell) had “never met a homosexual.”
Justice Blackmun found this statement to be particularly bizarre because had heard
from his own clerks that one of Justice Powell’s clerks the previous year was gay. I
think Justice Blackmun often wondered whether Justice Powell would have joined
Justice Blackmun’s opinion (turning it from a dissent into a majority) had he realized
12
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In 1991, four years following my clerkship, I finally told
Justice Blackmun that I was a lesbian. I was nervous about
doing so, remembering the Justice’s discomfort with
homosexuality. I believe the Justice’s residual discomfort with
homosexuals was still there when I told him. Yet his reaction
was telling and moving—encapsulating the nugget of
resistance to full equality for gay people that continues to exist
in our country, while still suggesting future possibilities for
real equality.
Here was my exchange with the Justice (as best as I can
remember it fifteen years later):
Chai: “Mr. Justice, I have something important to tell you. I want to
let you know that I’ve finally met someone and I’m really happy and
I’m really in love and we’re living together and . . . she’s a woman.”
Short pause.
Justice Blackmun: “Well, Chai . . . you know we want you to be
happy . . . and we care about you . . . and we love you anyway.”
Half beat of silence; Chai looks at the Justice.
Justice Blackmun: “You know, we love you.”

I believe there is a world of difference and a depth of
meaning between “We love you anyway” and “We love you.”
Let me explicate that difference by considering three possible
views that one might hold about gay people and gay sex. Each
of these views, I believe, holds sway in some segment of our
society today.
B.

Three Views of Gay Sex

One possible view of gay sex is that it is morally
harmful (and/or sinful) to the individual and to the community.
Therefore, it must be discouraged to the greatest extent
possible in order to advance the moral health of these
individuals and of the communities in which they reside. The
second view is that gay sexual activity is not good, but it is not
inherently harmful; it is more akin to an unfortunate,
abnormal health condition that one does not wish for oneself
(or for one’s children or law clerks), but it is not a harmful
that he did know a “lovely young man” who was a homosexual. As has since been
reported, that clerk anguished about whether to come out to Justice Powell, but
ultimately chose not to. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 52122 (1994).
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element that must be actively purged from society. The third
view is that gay sexual activity has the same moral valence as
heterosexual activity and gay people are basically similar to
straight people.
The first view of gay sex is the one underlying Justice
White’s majority decision in Hardwick and Justice Burger’s
concurrence in that case. It is this view that best explains the
(in)famous sentence in Justice White’s opinion: “No connection
between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand and
homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated,
either by the Court of Appeals or by respondent.” 13
This simple, conclusory statement that homosexual sex
has nothing to do with marriage and family, while heterosexual
sex presumably has something or a great deal to do with such
matters, will come as a great surprise to the many gay couples
who feel their sexual activity cements their personal intimacy
and perhaps their marital relationships. But Justice White’s
conclusory statement is valid if one assumes that homosexual
sex is immoral, wrong, harmful and sinful, and hence
necessarily antithetical to such moral goods as marriage and
family.
Indeed, this assumption is also what gives logical force
to Justice White’s statement that if the Court were to accept
Hardwick’s argument, “[I]t would be difficult, except by fiat, to
limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving
exposed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual
crimes even though they are committed in the home.” 14
Why would a court need to resort to “fiat” to find a
distinction between homosexual conduct and incest, and not
similarly have been required over the years to have resorted to
“fiat” to find a distinction between heterosexual conduct and
incest? Only if homosexual sex is as harmful and immoral as
incest and other sexual crimes and thus logically offers no
coherent manner of providing a distinction. According to the
first view of gay sex, this is indeed the case. Under that view,
the only way a court can possibly distinguish between the harm
of homosexual conduct and the harm of these other sexual
crimes is “by fiat.”
A second possible view of gay sex is that while it is not
good, it is also not inherently harmful. A person holding this
13
14

Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
Id. at 195-96 (emphasis added).

2006]

MORAL CONFLICT AND LIBERTY

71

view might believe that a desire for gay sex is abnormal and
that being gay is not a preferred sexual orientation (he/she
would certainly not want his/her own child to be gay). But,
nevertheless, this person might believe that gay sexual activity
is not inherently harmful to the individual and is not a moral
stain on society; it is simply an “unfortunate condition” with
which some people are born. Someone with this view might
believe that individuals who are born with this unfortunate or
aberrant condition should be tolerated by society and not
penalized for their sexual orientation. At the same time, a
person with such a view would be quite comfortable with
societal rules that demonstrate a preference for the more
normal and natural condition of heterosexual orientation—for
example, a societal rule that restricts civil marriage benefits to
heterosexual couples without extending similar societal
affirmation to gay couples.
Although it is hard to know for sure, my instinct is that
this second view reflects Justice Blackmun’s beliefs in 1991. I
think this is the view that is captured by the phrase: “We love
you anyway.” What I heard in that phrase was: “We are really
sorry you have been afflicted with this condition; we are so glad
to see that you are dealing with it so well, and we love you
despite this condition.” 15
I think one can also discern aspects of this view in
selected statements in Justice Blackmun’s Hardwick dissent.
For example, shortly following the eloquent statement about
personal intimacy that I quoted above, Justice Blackmun goes
on to observe the following:
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary
corollary of giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their
lives is acceptance of the fact that different individuals will make
different choices. For example, in holding that the clearly important
state interest in public education should give way to a competing
claim by the Amish to the effect that extended formal schooling
threatened their way of life, the Court declared: “There can be no
assumption that today’s majority is ‘right’ and the Amish and others
like them are ‘wrong.’ A way of life that is odd or even erratic but
15
It was also interesting to me that Justice Blackmun used the phrase “we”
in his response. That was so striking that I remember it these many years later. I
think Justice Blackmun might have explained the use of “we” as intending to
encompass himself, Dottie (his wife), Wanda and Wannett (the two secretaries), i.e.,
the “family” of the Blackmun Chambers. But I think it was also a use of a term that
was intentionally distancing, and less personal, than “I feel / I think.” It is also, as
Alyssa Rayman-Read points out, a term that placed me as the “other,” and all the
normal heterosexuals as the “we.”
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interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned
because it is different.” Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-224
(1972). The Court claims that its decision today merely refuses to
recognize a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy;
what the Court really has refused to recognize is the fundamental
interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their
intimate associations with others. 16

And although the paragraph ends there, one has the
sense that the author is saying to himself, “Even if that
intimate association is sort of ‘odd or even erratic,’ or maybe
just a bit unfortunate—like a bad medical condition.” The type
of condition that might make you love your law clerk “anyway.”
A third possible view of gay sex is that it has the same
moral valence as heterosexual sex. Both types of sex are
equally normal (or equally bizarre, as sex often is); both types
of sex partake of the same moral value when used to enhance
personal intimacy or to bring pleasure in a consensual
relationship; and both types of sex are morally bad when used
to subjugate or harm one of the parties.
Consistent with this view (and depending on one’s view
of the role of government), one can easily believe that
government has a role, for example, in creating a civil marriage
structure to support heterosexual and homosexual activity
designed to further personal intimacy and perhaps to include
the raising of children. Under this view, it would certainly be
irrational for the government to exclude couples that use gay
sex to create the same personal intimacy structure for which
other couples use heterosexual sex. 17
As Michael Sandel pointed out in an early article
analyzing Hardwick and Roe v. Wade, if Justice Blackmun had
believed that homosexual and heterosexual sex were morally
equivalent, his dissent could have been written quite
differently. 18 That is, instead of basing Michael Hardwick’s
right to engage in homosexual sodomy on the line of privacy
16
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 205-06 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
17
Even under this view, it is not clear why government should be supporting
only couples who are using sexual intimacy to cement their personal intimacy, as
opposed to relationships that use other forms of connections to cement similar, socially
useful bonds. See generally Chai R. Feldblum, Gay Is Good: The Moral Case for
Marriage Equality and More, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 139 (2005) [hereinafter
Feldblum, Gay Is Good] (making the case for societal support of non-sexual domestic
partners).
18
Michael J. Sandel, Moral Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and
Homosexuality, 77 CAL. L. REV. 521, 534 (1989).
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cases that protected one’s “right to be let alone,” 19 Justice
Blackmun could have rested his analysis directly on the line of
cases affirming an individual’s privacy right to enjoy intimate
relationships within families and among those rearing
children. 20 That is, following Justice White’s statement that he
could perceive no connection between “family, marriage, or
procreation on the one hand and homosexual activity on the
other,” 21 Justice Blackmun could have responded: “Of course
there is a connection. Homosexual activity and heterosexual
activity are equivalent—and both are used to facilitate
important moral goods such as family and marriage.”
But I do not think Justice Blackmun, in 1986, would
have been comfortable making such a claim of moral
equivalency between heterosexual and homosexual sex. Nor do
I believe he accepted such an equivalency in 1991, leading to
this reaction when finding out I was a lesbian: “We love you
anyway.”
I think Justice Blackmun stretched himself to perceive
the contours of the third view of gay sex (and, by extension, gay
people) in his amended statement of “We love you.” My guess
is that he truly felt: “It must be terrible to have this horrible
condition, Chai, but we love you anyway.” But he must have
quickly gathered that I did not experience that reaction as
positive. I think he suddenly realized that I did not think I had
a horrible condition and so I was not asking for tolerance or
sympathy. I was actually asking him to be happy for me
because I had finally found someone I loved. I was asking to be
treated in the same way he would have treated any other clerk
who had just said to him, “I am so happy. I have found the
person I want to marry!”
I think that realization is what prompted Justice
Blackmun to say “We love you,” and to take away the
“anyway.” I do not think he was as happy for me as he would
have been had I said, “I’m getting married to a man.” But he
did discern that I was happy and that I did not experience
19
In the first paragraph of his dissent, Justice Blackmun announces that
“this case is about ‘the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by
civilized men,’ namely, ‘the right to be let alone.’” Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 199 (quoting
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
20
Sandel, supra note 18, at 533-38. See also Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual
Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Revisited, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 331-34
(1996) [hereinafter Feldblum, Sexual Orientation] (discussing Sandel’s insights and
making the case for the moral equivalency of gay and heterosexual sex).
21
Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 191.
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myself as afflicted with an unfortunate social, physical or
mental condition. And so he stretched himself to acknowledge
that fact.
These alternative views of gay sex and gay people can
be directly correlated with a range of governmental policies.
The first view is the one that criminalizes homosexual sodomy
and removes children from parents who are gay. 22 The second
view is what permits legislators to vote for a bill that prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of sexual
orientation and to vote (on the same day) for a bill that
prohibits the federal government from recognizing state civil
marriages between same-sex couples. 23 The third view is what
would ensure complete and total equality for gay people,
without apologetics or qualifications.
But even the second view (which is probably the
predominant view in this country today) 24 poses challenges to
those individuals who adhere to the first view of gay sex.
There is a significant difference between a belief that a
characteristic is morally problematic and is best expunged or
repressed and a belief that a characteristic is unfortunate but
should be tolerated by society to some minimal extent. While,
22
For example, in 1885, Oscar Wilde was imprisoned under Section 11 of the
1885 Criminal Law Amendment Act for his relationship with the Marquess of
Queensbury. Judith Fingard, Book Review, 43 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 83, 83 (1999)
(reviewing MICHAEL S. FOLDY, THE TRIALS OF OSCAR WILDE: DEVIANCE, MORALITY,
AND LATE-VICTORIAN SOCIETY (1997)). The court sentenced Wilde to two years of hard
labor for “gross indecency” and “extensive corruption of the most hideous kind.” Id.
See, e.g., Ex Parte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., concurring)
(supporting denial of child custody to lesbian mother and stating that “Homosexual
conduct is, and has been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against
nature, and a violation of the laws of nature and of nature’s God upon which this
Nation and our laws are predicated. Such conduct violates both the criminal and civil
laws of this State and is destructive to a basic building block of society—the family.
The law of Alabama is not only clear in its condemning such conduct, but the courts of
this State have consistently held that exposing a child to such behavior has a
destructive and seriously detrimental effect on the children. It is an inherent evil
against which children must be protected.”); Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 692, 694 (Va.
1985) (denying child custody and visitation rights to gay father because he shares a
“bed and bedroom” with his male lover and stating that “[t]he father’s continuous
exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship renders him an unfit and
improper custodian as a matter of law”).
23
See Feldblum, Gay Is Good, supra note 17, at 145-50 (describing Senate
debate and analysis on the 49-50 vote in favor of the Employment Non-Discrimination
Act and the 85-14 vote in favor of the Defense of Marriage Act in 1996). See also Chai
R. Feldblum, The Moral Rhetoric of Legislation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 992, 996 (1997)
[hereinafter Feldblum, Moral Rhetoric] (describing consistent efforts to justify a vote
for ENDA as simply a vote for “equality” with no implications for moral views of
homosexuality).
24
See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
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obviously, there is even more of a significant difference
between the first view of gay sex and the third view, even
governmental policies premised on the second view can cause
conflict for those who adhere to the first view.
My guess is that Justice Blackmun continued to evolve
in his views about gay people, particularly as he worked with
clerks who were openly gay during their entire tenure with the
Justice. I doubt he ever became a full adherent of the third
view of gay sex (“Gay sex is morally equivalent to straight
sex”), but I think he might have been inching towards that
resolution.
And as I write this article, I wonder how Justice
Blackmun would have addressed and resolved the conflict I
explore in this piece. Based on my experience working with
him and my knowledge of him as a human being, I feel the
Justice would have seen and acknowledged the conflict and not
brushed it under the rug. As to whether he would have
resolved the conflict in the manner I recommend in this piece,
we will never know; some things are simply unfinished sagas.
III.

IMPACT ON BELIEF LIBERTY WHEN PROTECTING LGBT
LIBERTY

A.

Postulating an Age of LGBT Liberty

In 2006, the most pressing question for LGBT people
probably is not, “How can we be sure that we adequately
consider and take into account the beliefs of those who believe
we are immoral and sinful?” At the moment, it seems that
people who hold that point of view are prevailing in any
number of states, at the direct expense of LGBT people’s
liberty. Over the past decade, forty-one states have passed
statutory Defense of Marriage Acts, defining marriage as solely
between a man and a woman. 25 Twenty states have amended
their constitutions to restrict marriage in a similar fashion,
and eight more states had constitutional amendments on their
2006 ballots to do the same. 26 In thirty-three states, a person
can be fired from a job, thrown out of his or her apartment or
25
Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006).
26
Id. Seven out of those eight ballot initiatives passed in November 2006.
See Monica Davey, Liberals Find Rays of Hope on Ballot Measures, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2006, at P16.
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refused service in a restaurant simply because he or she is gay,
lesbian or bisexual. 27
Given the current state of affairs, I do not disagree that
the primary focus and energy of the LGBT movement must be
directed at resisting efforts to deny LGBT people liberty and
fighting for legislation and judicial outcomes that will allow
LGBT people to live lives of honesty and safety in today’s
society. Indeed, I have spent a fair portion of the last twenty
years of my professional life engaged in that precise struggle
and I expect to do more of the same in the future. 28
But I also believe it is only a matter of time before the
world around us changes significantly. In some number of
years (I do not know how many), I believe a majority of
jurisdictions in this country will have modified their laws so
that LGBT people will have full equality in our society,
including access to civil marriage or civil unions that carry the
same legal effect as civil marriage. Or perhaps federal
statutory changes, together with federal constitutional
decisions, may result in LGBT people achieving full liberty
across all states. At the very least, I believe it is worth
postulating this outcome and considering now, rather than
later, the impact that the achievement of such liberty might
have on employers, landlords and others whose moral values
(derived from religious sources or secular sources) teach them
27
Nat’l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, State Nondiscrimination Laws in the
U.S., http://thetaskforce.org/downloads/nondiscriminationmap.pdf (last visited Sept.
27, 2006).
28
From 1988 to 1990, I was a staff attorney with the ACLU AIDS Project and
the ACLU Lesbian & Gay Rights Project. In 1993, I was the Legal Director of the
Campaign for Military Service, an enterprise to help lift the ban on the service of gay
people in the military. From 1993 to 1998, I worked as a consultant to the Human
Rights Campaign, a political organization dedicated to advancing gay rights. In that
capacity, I wrote innumerable drafts of a federal bill to establish non-discrimination in
employment on the basis of sexual orientation and negotiated with groups to bring
them on to support the bill. From 1999 to 2006, I was an advisor and consultant to the
National Gay & Lesbian Task Force, another political organization dedicated to
advancing lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender equality. I have written amicus
briefs on behalf of civil rights organizations, religious organizations, and gay rights
organizations in constitutional cases seeking to establish equality for gay people,
including the Supreme Courts cases of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), and
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and in several lower court cases challenging
the military’s ban on gay servicemembers. Since 2002, I have run a Web site designed
to help law schools respond to the presence of military recruiters that discriminate
against
openly
gay
law
students.
See
SolomonResponse.org,
http://www.solomonresponse.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). And in 2005, I began the
Moral Values Project, http://www.moralvaluesproject.org (last visited Sept. 27, 2006),
an enterprise dedicated to bringing a progressive moral voice to issues of sexuality,
sexual orientation, and gender in the public arena.
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to hold the first view of gay sex—that is, that same-sex sexual
conduct is sinful for the individual and harmful to society.
Why do I believe an era of full LGBT liberty is simply a
matter of time? A large part, I am sure, is due to my being an
optimist who believes that simple truth and justice usually win
out in the long run and that truth and justice demand full
liberty for LGBT people.
But my conviction also comes from observing changes in
our society over the past twenty years and from reading
opinion polls. The polling numbers indicate that an increasing
number of people in this country simply do not believe
homosexual orientation and conduct are as “big a deal” as they
once were.
These individuals may not particularly like
homosexuality, nor do they believe that homosexuality is
morally equivalent to heterosexuality. But they do not seem as
agitated about homosexuality as they have been in past
decades.
No poll that I have seen asks the question directly: “Do
you think homosexuality is a big deal?” But a reduced anxiety
about homosexuality is the overall gestalt that emerges upon
reviewing the myriad polls that have asked members of the
American public about their views on homosexuality over the
past thirty years. Karlyn Bowman, a resident scholar at the
American Enterprise Institute (“AEI”) who specializes in
polling data, has done a Herculean task of reviewing and
compiling information from over 200 polls, conducted from
1972 to 2006, that have asked questions about the American
public’s attitudes towards homosexuality. 29 Bowman’s report is
both illuminating and intriguing.
Bowman begins her report with a section called
Acceptance and notes the following:
In 1973, when the National Opinion Research Center at the
University of Chicago [“NORC”] first asked people about sexual
relations between two adults of the same sex, 73 percent described
29
See KARLYN BOWMAN & ADAM FOSTER, AMER. ENTER. INST., ATTITUDES
ABOUT HOMOSEXUALITY AND GAY MARRIAGE, http://www.aei.org/publications/
filter.all,pubID.14882/pub_detail.asp (last visited Sept. 27, 2006). I do not purport to
be an expert in polling data nor do I assert that every survey I cite in the following
paragraphs and footnotes is necessarily free from methodological errors. My sole
assertion is that I believe Bowman’s compilation indicates a trend towards the public
caring less about homosexuality as a morally problematic issue. That trend is
sufficient to make me think it is at least probable that civil rights laws protecting the
liberty of LGBT people might be enacted over the coming decades and that the passage
of such laws might then burden the liberty of those who believe that homosexuality is
morally problematic.
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them as “always wrong” and another 7 percent as “almost always
wrong.” When the organization last asked the question in 2004, 58
percent called them always wrong and 5 percent almost always
wrong. NORC interviewers have asked the same question about
extramarital sexual relations over the period, and they find no
liberalization in attitudes. 30

The Roper Center at the University of Connecticut,
together with AEI, did a subgroup analysis of the NORC cohort
data. Their analysis showed that in the age cohort of 30-44,
there was an even more significant reduction in the percentage
of respondents who believed homosexual relations were
“always wrong.” In 1973, 74% of respondents in that age
cohort believed homosexual sexual relations were “always
wrong.” 31 In 2002, only 48% of respondents in that age cohort
answered that homosexual sexual relations were “always
wrong”—a reduction of 26%. 32
Bowman’s compilation also indicates that an enduring
half of the American public continues to believe that
homosexuality is not morally acceptable, although that number
appears to decrease slightly if respondents are asked about
“homosexual relationships” or homosexuality as an “acceptable
alternative lifestyle,” rather than about “homosexual
behavior.” 33 The number of people who say they personally
30

Id. at 2. The NORC survey found that 70% of respondents in 1973 thought
that a married person having sex outside of his or her marriage was “always wrong.”
Id. at 47. That number stayed consistently in the 70% range every year the survey was
conducted until 2004, when 80% of respondents thought extramarital sex was “always
wrong.” Id. at 47-48.
31
Id. at 3.
32
Id. The subgroup analysis also looked at sex, race, education, church
attendance, region, party, ideology and family income. Id. The significant changes
among younger people are apparent in other surveys as well. In a University of
California at Los Angeles Cooperative Institutional Research Program survey of college
freshman, 47% of respondents in 1976 answered that “[i]t is important to have laws
prohibiting homosexual relationships.” Id. at 6. By 2005, that number had decreased
to 25%. Id.
33
For example, a February 2006 survey by Princeton Survey Research
Associates (“PSRA”)/Pew Research Center found that 50% of respondents believe that
“homosexual behavior” is “wrong,” and a May 2006 Gallup poll found that 51% of
respondents believe that “homosexual behavior” is “morally wrong.” Id. at 4. A Los
Angeles Times survey in 2000 found that 51% of respondents believed that “sexual
relations between adults of the same gender” is “always wrong.” Id. By contrast, a
February 2004 Harris/CNN/Time poll found that only 38% of respondents considered
“homosexual relationships” to be “not acceptable,” while 49% considered them
acceptable for others but not themselves, and 11% considered them acceptable both for
others and for themselves. Id. at 5. A May 2006 Gallup poll found that 54% of
respondents felt that “homosexuality should be considered an acceptable alternative
lifestyle,” while 41% felt it should not. Id. at 6. And the percentage of people who
believe that “homosexuality is a way of life that should be discouraged by society” has
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know a gay person, however, or who say they have become
more accepting of gays and lesbians over the past few years,
has increased significantly over the past fifteen years. 34
Of particular note is the number of people who seem to
have discovered gay people in their own families. In a 1992
Princeton Survey Research Associates (“PSRA”)/Newsweek poll,
9% of respondents said that someone in their family was gay or
lesbian, while 90% reported that there was no one in their
family who was gay or lesbian. 35 In 2000, 23% of respondents
said that someone in their family was gay or lesbian, while only
75% reported there was no one in their family who was gay or
lesbian. 36 Given that the number of gay people probably did
not increase 14% between 1992 and 2000, one must presume
that more gay people told their families about their sexual
orientation during that time period. 37
Perhaps because of the greater familiarity that
members of the American public are beginning to have with
gay people (including their own family members), purging
homosexuality from our society does not appear to be a huge
priority for a significant segment of our public. What is
particularly interesting about Bowman’s polling compilation is
the number of people who do not think homosexuality is a
moral issue at all, 38 and the significant percentage who do not
remained below 50% (ranging from 41% to 45%) in responses to a PSRA/Pew Research
Center survey in 1999, 2000, 2003 and 2004. Id. at 8.
34
In a PSRA/Newsweek poll in 1985, only 22% of respondents said they had a
“friend or close acquaintance” who was gay or lesbian. Id. at 16. In a 2000
PSRA/Newsweek poll, 56% of respondents said they had a “friend or close
acquaintance” who was gay or lesbian. Id. In a July 2003 Gallup poll, 32% of
respondents indicated they had “become more accepting of gays and lesbians” over the
past few years, 59% said their attitudes had not changed, and 8% said they had become
less accepting. Id. at 10.
35
BOWMAN & FOSTER, supra note 29, at 16.
36
Id.
37
Along the lines of increasing knowledge about gay family members, I have
always appreciated Professor Nan Hunter’s idea of a “Thanksgiving Family Coming
Out Day.” Every Thanksgiving, every family with a gay member should tell another
family about the gay family member. If all families with a known gay member would
adopt this tradition, my guess is that almost every person in America would end up
knowing (or knowing of) one gay person within some number of years.
38
For example, in a February 2006 survey by PSRA/Pew Research Center,
33% of respondents stated that “homosexual behavior” was “not a moral issue,” while
12% called such behavior “acceptable.” BOWMAN & FOSTER, supra note 29, at 4. In the
May 2006 Gallup question, in which respondents were given only the options of
“homosexual behavior” being “morally wrong” or “morally acceptable,” 44% of
respondents said it was morally acceptable. Id. It seems likely to me that the Pew
data are more consistent with a significant segment of the public’s view—i.e., that
homosexuality is not something to be agitated about (the second view of gay sex), but is
also not something they would call “morally acceptable” (the third view of gay sex).
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think it would matter that much if there was greater
acceptance of gay people in society. For example, in a 2003
PSRA/Pew Research Center survey, respondents were asked
the following question: “Do you think more acceptance of gays
and lesbians would be a good thing or a bad thing for the
country—or that it would not make much difference either
way?” 39 Only 31% of respondents said that more acceptance of
gay people would be bad for the country. 40 Twenty-three
percent thought it would be good for the country and 42% felt it
would not make much difference. 41
To me, these various polls taken together indicate that
there is a significant number of people (but substantially less
than a strong majority of people) in this country who believe
that homosexuality is morally problematic and that society
must therefore do what it can to discourage, disapprove of and
reduce the incidence of homosexual behavior. These are the
individuals whom I would consider to hold the first view of gay
sex I describe above. There is also a much smaller group of
people who believe that homosexuality is as morally acceptable
as heterosexuality. These are the individuals whom I would
consider to hold the third view of gay sex I describe above.
And, finally, there is a significant group of people in the
middle. These people adhere to the second view of gay sex and
therefore hold conflicting views about public policy and
homosexuality. They do not feel homosexuality is morally
equivalent to heterosexuality and so they are not interested in
conferring civil marriage on gay couples. 42 But they also do not
believe it would be terribly harmful for society if gay couples
were acknowledged and permitted to have equal rights. 43

39

Id. at 7.
Id.
41
Id. A 2004 Harris/CNN/Time poll reflects similar indifference. In that
poll, respondents were asked whether they would be more or less likely to vote for a
candidate who favored legalizing gay marriage, or whether it would make no
difference. Id. at 15. Forty-eight percent of respondents said they would be less likely
to vote for such a candidate, 10% said they would be more likely to vote for such a
candidate, and 39% said it would make no difference to them. Id.
42
Id. at 21-24 (noting various polls showing consistent 50% to 65%
disapproval of marriage for same-sex couples when respondents are given the
opportunity to note solely their approval or disapproval of marriage for same-sex
couples).
43
For example, in a 2003 Gallup/CNN/USA Today poll, respondents were
asked whether “allowing two people of the same sex to legally marry will change our
society for the better, will it have no effect, or will it change our society for the worse?”
Forty-eight percent thought it would change our society for the worse, 10% thought it
40
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Thus, when given the choice between marriage or civil unions
for same-sex couples, and no legal recognition for same-sex
couples at all, support for “no legal recognition” never goes
above 50% and, in most cases, hovers between 35% and 40%. 44
Conversely, when one combines the small public support for
gay marriage with the more substantial support for civil
unions, there is consistently a majority of support for some
legal recognition of gay couples. 45
What this means to me is that the second view of gay
sex holds significant sway in our society today. As I note
above, I presume most parents today would prefer their child
not be gay. But if their child was gay, these parents may no
longer believe they must desperately seek out professional
“help” for the child. The large number of well-adjusted, happy
and successful gay people living openly and honestly in today’s
society reinforces the medical profession’s current judgment
that there is nothing psychologically wrong with being gay. 46
would change our society for the better, and 40% thought it would have no effect on our
society. Id. at 25.
44
BOWMAN & FOSTER, supra note 29, at 27-28 (reviewing one poll from 2000,
and fifteen polls from 2004, that gave respondents the option between marriage, civil
unions, and no legal recognition for same-sex couples).
45
Id. What is particularly fascinating is that people report more moral
disapproval of homosexuality among the American public than the polls indicate there
actually is. A 2001 Gallup poll asked, “What is your impression of how most Americans
feel about homosexual behavior—do most Americans think it is acceptable or not
acceptable?” Seventy-four percent responded that most Americans believe homosexual
behavior is not acceptable, while 21% responded that most Americans believe
homosexual behavior is acceptable. Id. at 7. In fact, a May 2001 Gallup poll found that
40% of respondents considered “homosexual behavior” to be “morally acceptable,” while
53% found it to be “morally wrong.” Id. at 4. And in the NORC survey of 2002, 55%
said homosexual behavior was “always wrong” and 5% said it was “almost always”
wrong; 33% said it was “not wrong” and 7% said it was “only sometimes” wrong. Id. at
2.
46
See, e.g., Amer. Psychiatric Ass’n, Gay Lesbian and Bisexual Issues,
http://healthyminds.org/glbissues.cfm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006) (quoting a 1992
American Psychiatric Association (“APA”) statement: “Whereas homosexuality per se
implies no impairment in judgment, stability, reliability, or general social or vocational
capabilities, the [APA] calls on all international health organizations and individual
psychiatrists in other countries, to urge the repeal in their own country of legislation
that penalized homosexual acts by consenting adults in private. And further the APA
calls on these organizations and individuals to do all that is possible to decrease the
stigma related to homosexuality wherever and whenever it may occur.”); Amer.
Psychological Ass’n, Being Gay Is Just as Healthy as Being Straight,
http://www.psychologymatters.org/hooker.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2006); Child
Welfare League of America, LGBTQ Youth Issues: About the Program,
http://www.cwla.org/programs/culture/glbtqabout.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006)
(noting the Child Welfare League of America’s “full support for all young people,
regardless of sexual orientation”); Child Welfare League of America, Position
Statement on Parenting of Children by Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Adults,
http://www.cwla.org/programs/culture/glbtqposition.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2006)
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And more and more people are beginning to accept that
individuals do not “choose” homosexuality; they are simply
emotionally and physically happier with an individual of the
same sex. 47 It is also possible that the horror value of
discovering one’s child is gay has subsided. Although the
majority of parents today may not want their child to be gay,
they are probably less horrified to find out their child is gay
than they would be if they discovered their child was having
sex with his or her sibling, having sex with a child or having
sex in public.
And, at bottom, these parents do not want their children
discriminated against “just because they are gay.” Parents
may not like the fact that their child is gay, but they also do
not want American society to penalize their child unduly for
that fact. 48

(“The Child Welfare League of America . . . affirms that lesbian, gay, and bisexual
parents are as well suited to raise children as their heterosexual counterparts.”).
47
See, e.g., BOWMAN & FOSTER, supra note 29, at 19 (surveying relevant polls
and concluding that “[o]ne of the most dramatic changes in attitudes about
homosexuality appears to be about its cause. More people than in the past say that
people are born homosexual or that it is an orientation that they cannot change. In a
Gallup question from 1977, 12% said homosexuality was something a person was born
with; in 2003, 38% gave that response.”).
48
What many of these people and their friends do, with regard to public
policies, is engage in “moral bracketing.” Moral bracketing, a basic component of
liberal political theory, allows people to say both that homosexuality is wrong and that
antigay discrimination is wrong. Under this liberal view, as long as gay people do not
harm anyone else, the State should be tolerant of them. See Feldblum, Gay Is Good,
supra note 17 at 147-50 (describing moral bracketing).
The advantages and
disadvantages of moral bracketing have intrigued me for over a decade. See generally
Chai R. Feldblum, The Federal Gay Rights Bill: From Bella to ENDA, in CREATING
CHANGE: SEXUALITY, PUBLIC POLICY, AND CIVIL RIGHTS 149 (John D’Emilio et al. eds.,
2000) [hereinafter Feldblum, Federal Gay Rights]; Chai R. Feldblum, The Limitations
of Liberal Neutrality Arguments in Favour of Same-Sex Marriage, in LEGAL
RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS: A STUDY OF NATIONAL, EUROPEAN AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 55 (Robert Wintemute & Mads Andnæs eds., 2001); Feldblum,
Moral Rhetoric, supra note 23; Chai R. Feldblum, A Progressive Moral Case for SameSex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 485 (1998); Feldblum, Sexual
Orientation, supra note 20. My personal belief is that we will be able to achieve full
liberty for LGBT people only if we directly engage in a moral discourse about sexuality,
sexual orientation, and gender in the public domain. The Moral Values Project, an
enterprise I began working on in 2005, is designed to reach people who believe
homosexuality is immoral but who also believe gay people should not be discriminated
against. One goal of the Moral Values Project is to move people from the “I love you
anyway” stance to the “I love you” stance—that is, from the second view of gay sex I
describe above to the third view of gay sex. For purposes of this article, however, I am
postulating a trend towards more legal protection and equality for LGBT people,
whether it is achieved through a continuation of moral bracketing (as some people
believe it can be) or through a new engagement with moral discourse (as I believe is
necessary).
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For purposes of this article, therefore, I would like to
postulate that the coming decades will see a rise in legislation
and judicial opinions favoring full liberty for LGBT people.
Assuming that is the case, how should the LGBT movement
think about the fact that granting liberty to gay people might
put a burden on people holding the first view of gay sex—
people who feel that if they rent an apartment to a gay couple,
allow a gay couple to eat at their restaurant or provide health
benefits to a same-sex spouse, it is tantamount to aiding and
abetting sinful or immoral behavior?
B.

Impact of LGBT Liberty on Belief Liberty

To consider the question I pose above as relevant at all,
one has to believe that a civil rights law that protects the
liberty of LGBT people by prohibiting discrimination based on
sexual orientation or gender identity (or by conferring civil
union or marriage status on same-sex couples) places a burden
on the liberty of some people regulated by the law. This is not
self-evident. Many people believe these laws merely regulate
the “conduct” of such individuals and have little or no impact
on such individuals’ beliefs, identities or practices.
The liberty I believe such laws might, in certain
circumstances, burden is what I call “belief liberty.” 49 What I
mean by “burden” is that the law requires an individual to
engage in conduct that requires him or her to act in a manner
inconsistent with his or her deepest held beliefs. From a
liberty perspective, whether these beliefs stem from a religious
source or from a secular source is irrelevant. What is common
among these belief systems, and what should be relevant for
the liberty analysis, is that these beliefs form a core aspect of
the individual’s sense of self and purpose in the world.
Certainly, in America today, religious people of certain
denominations are likely to be disproportionately burdened by
laws that regulate their conduct with regard to gay people. For
example, current polling data shows that, while the majority of
Americans (58%) say marriage for same-sex couples should not
be permitted, a much larger 85% of self-identified conservative
Republicans and evangelical, white Protestants say that gay

49
I explain what I mean by “belief liberty,” as well as what I consider
“identity liberty” and “bodily liberty” infra Part B.2.a.
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marriage should be illegal. 50 But we miss the mark, I think, if
we analyze this burden solely as a burden on religious liberty,
writ narrow, rather than as a burden on belief liberty, writ
large. Obviously, as I note in the introduction to this article,
the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Division v.
Smith 51 limits the reach of the Free Exercise Clause as a
practical matter. But, as a theoretical matter, I believe it is
more appropriate to analyze these belief claims as liberty
claims and not to elevate religious beliefs over other deeply
held beliefs derived from non-religious sources. From the
perspective of a person holding a particular belief, the intensity
of that belief may be as strong regardless of whether it derives
from a religious or a non-religious source.
Fully recognizing the existence of this type of burden
requires two steps. First, we must consider what moral values
are inherent in civil rights laws and whether these values
might conflict with the deeply held beliefs of some individuals
who are regulated by the law. Second, we must consider
whether forcing someone to act (or not to act) in a certain way
can burden a liberty interest that should be protected under
the Due Process Clause.
1. The Moral Values in Civil Rights Laws
A major strand of liberal political theory postulates that
“morality”—in the sense of a moral, normative view of “the
good”—is not the proper object of governmental action.
According to this view, individuals living in a pluralist society
will inevitably hold divergent normative and moral beliefs, and
the role of law and government is to adequately safeguard the
rights necessary for each individual to pursue his or her own
normative view of “the good life”—not to affirmatively advance
one moral view of “the good” over others. 52
50
Gary Langer, Most Oppose Gay Marriage; Fewer Back an Amendment,
ABC NEWS, June 5, 2006, http://abcnews.go.com/US/Politics/story?id=2041689
&page=1.
51
494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (holding that “the right of free exercise does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid and neutral law of
general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that
his religion prescribes (or proscribes)’” (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263
n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring))).
52
See BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 349-78
(1980); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 90-100 (1977); JOHN RAWLS, The
Priority of Right and Ideas of the Good, in POLITICAL LIBERALISM 173, 173-211 (1996).
See generally Feldblum, Gay Is Good, supra note 17, at 143-50 (describing liberal
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In a recent short comment on why government should
not be involved in recognizing any marriages (for either samesex couples or opposite-sex couples), Tamara Metz nicely
captures this viewpoint. Metz posits that the goal of marriage
as an institution is to have a couple’s relationship supported by
an ethical authority outside the couple itself. And the “liberal
state,” argues Metz, is “ill suited to serve as an ethical
authority.” 53 Why? As Metz explains: “Ideally, the liberal
state is relatively distant, more legal than moral, and more
neutral than not among competing worldviews so as to protect
individual freedom and diversity.” 54
I do not disagree that a liberal state must have, as its
highest priority, the protection of pluralist ways of living
among its citizens, subject to such ways of living not harming
others in society.
My argument is simply that when
government decides, through the enactment of its laws, that a
certain way of life does not harm those living that life and does
not harm others exposed to such individuals, the government is
necessarily staking out a position of moral neutrality with
regard to that way of living. And that position of moral
neutrality may stand in stark contrast to those who believe
that the particular way of living at issue is morally laden and
problematic.
I have both documented and personally watched as
supporters of a gay civil rights bill have gone to great lengths
to argue that they are not taking a position on the morality of
homosexuality or bisexuality by supporting such a law. 55 I
agree that supporting such a law does not necessarily convey a
message that “gay is good.” But it is disingenuous to say that
voting for a law of this kind conveys no message about morality
at all. The only way to justify prohibiting private employers,
landlords and business owners from discriminating against gay
people is to make the prior moral assessment that acting on
one’s homosexual orientation is not so morally problematic as
neutrality approach); Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, supra note 20, at 245-46 (same).
Carlos Ball has written extensively on liberal neutrality in the context of gay rights.
See CARLOS BALL, THE MORALITY OF GAY RIGHTS (2002).
53
Tamara Metz, Why We Should Disestablish Marriage, in MARY LYNDON
SHANLEY, JUST MARRIAGE 99, 101 (Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004).
54
Id. at 102.
55
See, e.g., Feldblum, Federal Gay Rights, supra note 48 (documenting moral
bracketing throughout introduction of recurring gay rights bills); Feldblum, Moral
Rhetoric, supra note 23, at 996-1004 (deconstructing moral bracketing done by various
Members of Congress during a hearing on ENDA).

86

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

to justify private parties discriminating against such
individuals in the public domain. To return to the three
possible views of gay sex, supporting a law that prohibits
discrimination based on sexual orientation requires that the
supporter hold, at a minimum, the second view of gay sex—
even though it does not require that the supporter hold the
third view.
For example, we do not have laws today that protect
those who engage in pedophilia or domestic violence from
employment, housing or public accommodation discrimination.
We do not ask about these groups of individuals: “Well, but can
they type? Can they do the job?” I do not believe the lack of
such laws is due solely to the lack of an adequate “pedophile
lobby” or “domestic violence abuser lobby.” Rather, I believe
society (as reflected in its government’s public policy) has
determined that actions of this kind hurt others and are thus
morally problematic. For that reason, a private actor who uses
the fact that an individual has engaged in these actions as
grounds for exclusion is not viewed as engaging in unjustified
discrimination.
This analysis works equally well to explain and describe
the status quo in which LGBT people currently remain
vulnerable to private and public discrimination. When the
government fails to pass a law prohibiting non-discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation, in the face of documentation
that such discrimination occurs on a regular basis, or fails to
allow same-sex couples access to civil marriage when the
practical need for that access has been documented for scores of
families, the government is similarly taking a position on a
moral question. The State has decided that a homosexual or
bisexual orientation is not morally neutral, but rather may
legitimately be viewed by some as morally problematic. It is
precisely that determination which permits legislators to
continue denying full liberty to those who act on their
homosexual or bisexual orientations and who are open and
honest about their actions.
In these cases, the issue is often framed as a question of
“equality.” That is certainly true. The existence of civil rights
laws, as well as the absence of such laws, will determine how
much equality LGBT people enjoy in our society. But let us be
clear: the fact that this is a question of equality should not
obscure the fact that this is also a question of morality. And
that is because moral beliefs necessarily underlie the
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assessment of whether such equality is justifiably granted or
denied.
Once we acknowledge these moral assessments, it
becomes easier to understand that a civil rights law prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation might be shocking
for some members of society. For those who believe that a
homosexual or bisexual orientation is not morally neutral, and
that an individual who acts on his or her homosexual
orientation acts in a sinful or harmful manner (to himself or
herself and to others), it is problematic when the government
passes a law that gives such individuals equal access to all
societal institutions. Such a law rests on a moral assessment of
homosexuality and bisexuality that is radically different from
their own. Such a law presumes the moral neutrality of
homosexuality and bisexuality, while those who oppose the law
believe homosexuality and bisexuality are morally problematic.
Conversely, for those who believe that any sexual
orientation, including a homosexual or bisexual orientation, is
morally neutral, and that an individual who acts on his or her
homosexual or bisexual orientation acts in an honest and good
manner, it is problematic when the government fails to pass
laws providing equality to such individuals. The failure to pass
such a law rests on a moral assessment of homosexuality and
bisexuality that is radically different from their own. Such
failure presumes homosexuality and bisexuality are morally
problematic, while those who desire the law believe
homosexuality and bisexuality are morally neutral.
Given this reality, we are in a zero-sum game: a gain for
one side necessarily entails a corresponding loss for the other
side.
This is why then-Professor (now Judge) Michael
McConnell is correct to observe that disputes surrounding
sexual orientation “feature a seemingly irreconcilable clash
between those who believe that homosexual conduct is immoral
and those who believe that it is a natural and morally
unobjectionable
manifestation
of
human
sexuality.” 56
McConnell believes that the debate over sexual orientation is
best approached by the government extending respect to both
of these positions, without taking sides on either position.

56
See Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out Religion, 50
DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 43-44 (2000).
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Thus, using an analogy to the respect people seek from
government for their religious beliefs, he urges the following:
The starting point would be to extend respect to both sides in the
conflict of opinion, to treat both the view that homosexuality is a
healthy and normal manifestation of human sexuality and the view
that homosexuality is unnatural and immoral as conscientious
positions, worthy of respect, much as we treat both atheism and
faith as worthy of respect. In using the term “respect,” I do not mean
agreement. Rather, I mean the civil toleration we extend to fellow
citizens and fellow human beings even when we disagree with their
views. We should recognize that the “Civil Magistrate” is no more
“competent a Judge” of the “Truth” about human sexuality than
about religion. 57

But what McConnell fails to appreciate in his analysis is
the zero-sum nature of the game. That is, he fails to recognize
that the government is necessarily taking a stance on the moral
question every time it fails to affirmatively ensure that gay
people can live openly, safely and honestly in society.
Note, for example, how McConnell characterizes
possible governmental actions (and inactions) under his
recommended approach:
Under this approach, the state should not impose a penalty on
practices associated with or compelled by any of the various views of
homosexuality, and should refrain from using its power to favor,
promote, or advance one position over the other. The difference
between a “gay rights” position and a “First Amendment” approach
is that the former adopts as its governing principle the idea that
homosexuality is normal, natural, and morally unobjectionable,
while the latter takes the view that the moral issue is not for the
government to decide. Thus, the government would not punish
sexual acts by consenting gay individuals, nor would it use sexual
orientation as a basis for classification or discrimination, without
powerful reasons, not grounded in moral objections, for taking such
action. On the other hand, the government would not attempt to
project this posture of moral neutrality onto the private sphere, but
would allow private forces in the culture to determine the ultimate
social response. 58

57
58

Id. at 44.
Id. (emphasis added). As McConnell concludes:

Such an approach would produce many of the same advantages for this
cultural conflict that the First Amendment produces for religious conflict.
This approach would provide the basis for civic peace on an issue where the
nation is dangerously divided, it would provide maximum respect for
individual conscience, it would depoliticize an issue that many of us believe is
private and not political in character, and it would help to restore the publicprivate distinction.
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It seems apparent from McConnell’s writing (although,
for some reason, he fails to state so explicitly) that the “gay
rights” position is one that calls for government intervention in
the private sector through laws that make discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation illegal or that make civil
marriage available to same-sex couples. I gather that is what
McConnell is referring to by the government “project[ing] this
posture of moral neutrality onto the private sphere.” 59
But if that is the case, McConnell is simply wrong to
assume that a government’s failure to pass such laws rests on
the view “that the moral issue is not for the government to
decide.” The government is taking a position on the moral
question when it fails to extend access to civil marriage to
same-sex couples. It is precisely because some people hold the
view that homosexuality is immoral that gay people have been
denied equal protection under the law up until this point.
Government has not simply been sitting on the sidelines of
these moral questions during all the time it has failed to pass
laws protecting the liberty of LGBT people. Government has
quite clearly been taking a side—and it has not been taking the
side that helps gay people.
McConnell correctly diagnoses the opposing moral
viewpoints, but his proposed solution is no more satisfying than
the solutions proposed by gay rights leaders who characterize
gay civil rights laws as simple “neutral” prescriptions of
equality that have no impact on a person’s religious or moral
beliefs. Both McConnell and these gay rights leaders are
trying to deal with the conflict by simply wishing it away. That
is neither possible nor intellectually honest.
2. The Burden on Liberty
Passage of a law based on a moral assessment different
from one’s own can certainly make an individual feel alienated
from his or her government and fellow citizens. But that is a
far cry from accepting that such a law burdens one’s liberty in
a way that might require further justification by the State. I
might disagree with my government’s foreign policy or
economic policy and think on some days that I would be
happier living in some other country. But without something

Id. at 44-45.
59

Id. at 44.
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more, it is hard to argue that my liberty—even something as
broad as my “belief liberty”—has been burdened.
The “something more,” from my perspective, is a legal
requirement that an individual act, or refrain from acting, in a
manner that the individual can credibly claim undermines his
or her core beliefs and sense of self. Without such a trigger, a
claim that one’s liberty has been burdened cannot legitimately
be maintained. Explicating this point requires a discussion of
both belief liberty and the interaction between conduct and
belief.
a. Three Forms of Liberty
It is way past time to get over the Lochner era’s 60
baggage and embrace the full scope of our Due Process Clause’s
liberty interest. Numerous scholars over the past thirty years
have produced compelling and thoughtful analyses of the
liberty interest embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. 61 My goal in this section is more limited. I want
to focus on Justice David Souter’s comprehensive and
historically far-reaching concurrence in Washington v.
Glucksberg 62 and suggest that we apply the lessons of that
concurrence to thinking about belief liberty more generally.
In his Glucksberg concurrence, Justice Souter is clear
that he believes the Lochner line of cases was incorrectly
decided. But that is not because a person’s “right to choose a
calling” is not an essential “element of liberty.” 63 Rather, it is
because the Court’s decisions in the Lochner line of cases
“harbored the spirit of Dred Scott in their absolutist
60
The era was named after the substantive due process case of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
61
For just a small sample, see RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST
CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the
New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491 (2002); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and the Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2003); Laurence
H. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973); Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental
Right” That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004) [hereinafter
Tribe, Lawrence]; Robin West, Reconstructing Liberty, 59 TENN. L. REV. 441 (1992).
62
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 752-89 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
63
Id. at 759 (noting that the standard of reasonableness or arbitrariness
under the Due Process Clause is “fairly traceable to Justice Bradley’s dissent in the
Slaughter-House Cases, in which he said that a person’s right to choose a calling was
an element of liberty . . . and declared that the liberty and property protected by due
process are not truly recognized if such rights may be ‘arbitrarily assailed’” (citation
omitted)).
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implementation of the standard they espoused.” 64 In other
words, it is not that living and working where one wills is not
an essential part of liberty. But the government must have the
ability to regulate that liberty in a reasonable manner in order
to carry out its important interests. 65 The Court’s failure in the
Lochner line of cases was its failure to properly judge and apply
the government’s important interest in protecting the social
and economic welfare of its citizens. It was not a failure in
judging the importance of work as an element of liberty. 66
Justice Souter’s main priority in his Glucksberg
concurrence, however, is not to revive the importance of
contract as a liberty interest. His main objective is to attack
the Court’s approach, over the past fifty years, of focusing
almost exclusively on whether a proclaimed liberty interest is a
“fundamental right,” and then almost invariably invalidating
any legislation burdening such a right. To Justice Souter, this
approach not only represents a wrong turn from earlier
substantive due process jurisprudence, but it also elides the
key point that liberty interests naturally fall across a
spectrum. Thus, many interests can be “liberty” interests and
still be justifiably burdened by the government because of the
needs of society. 67
64

Id. at 761. Justice Souter begins his historical overview by reminding us
that one of the first instances in which the Court applied the Due Process Clause was
“the case that the [Fourteenth] Amendment would in due course overturn, Dred Scott
v. Sandford.” Id. at 758 (citation omitted).
65
In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), the Court said that
Fourteenth Amendment liberty includes
the right of the citizen to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be
free to use them in all lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his
livelihood by any lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for
that purpose to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and
essential to his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes above
mentioned.
Id. at 589. Justice Souter’s observation of Allgeyer is the following: “Although this
principle was unobjectionable, what followed for a season was, in the realm of economic
legislation, the echo of Dred Scott.” Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 760 (Souter, J.,
concurring).
66
While the ability to pursue one’s calling can fall within the identity liberty
I describe below, one must admit that the Court’s assessment that one needs perfect
economic freedom in doing so (including the freedom to agree to wretched work
conditions), see, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59-61 (1905), was yet another
failing of reasoning in many of the Lochner-era cases.
67
Scholars have correctly pointed out that the opinion authored by Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), focused on a similar liberty spectrum. See, e.g., Randy E.
Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, 2002-2003 CATO
SUP. CT. REV. 21, 33 (2003). Barnett notes that the discussion of the liberty right in
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Justice Souter finds guidance for this approach in
Justice Harlan’s dissent from dismissal on jurisdictional
grounds in Poe v. Ullman:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause
cannot be found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific
guarantees elsewhere provided in the Constitution. This “liberty” is
not a series of isolated points pricked out in terms of the taking of
property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion; the right to keep
and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints, and which also recognizes,
what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that certain
interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs
asserted to justify their abridgment. 68

For Justice Souter, the type of interests that would
require particularly careful scrutiny would presumably be
those described in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey, an opinion written jointly by Justices
O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter:
These matters [personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education],
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. 69

Casey is commonly attributed to Justice Kennedy. Id. Assuming that is true, there are
two Justices on the current court, Justices Kennedy and Souter, who appear to be
deeply invested in a flexible liberty analysis. See Post, supra note 61, at 85-96 (noting
flexibility in the early evolution of modern substantive due process and describing the
rigidity articulated by the Glucksberg majority).
68
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Justice Souter begins his substantive analysis in his Glucksberg concurrence
as follows:
My understanding of unenumerated rights in the wake of the Poe dissent and
subsequent cases avoids the absolutist failing of many older cases without
embracing the opposite pole of equating reasonableness with past practice
described at a very specific level. That understanding begins with a concept
of “ordered liberty,” comprising a continuum of rights to be free from
“arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints.”
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 765 (Souter, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (quoting Poe,
367 U.S. at 543, 549).
69
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.

2006]

MORAL CONFLICT AND LIBERTY

93

Drawing from a historical overview of substantive due
process cases and Justice Harlan’s dissent in Poe, Justice
Souter articulates two basic guidelines for courts engaging in a
substantive due process analysis. First, a court “is bound to
confine the values that it recognizes to those truly deserving
constitutional stature” 70 —an approach that enables a court to
avoid engaging in piercing scrutiny of every conceivable burden
on liberty that may arise across the spectrum. 71 Second, a
court may not intervene “merely to identify a reasonable
resolution of contending values that differs from the terms of
the legislation under review.” 72 As Justice Souter articulates
the standard,
It is only when the legislation’s justifying principle, critically valued,
is so far from being commensurate with the individual interest as to
be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must give way.
Only if this standard points against the statute can the individual
claimant be said to have a constitutional right. 73

In an interesting (strategic?) move, Justice Souter never
directly repudiates the strict scrutiny standard requiring that
governmental restrictions on fundamental rights be narrowly
tailored to fit a compelling government interest. Indeed, he
repeats that standard in various citations in his concurrence. 74
70
71

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 767 (Souter, J., concurring).
As Justice Souter put it:

Justice Harlan thus recognized just what the Court today assumes, that by
insisting on a threshold requirement that the interest (or, as the Court puts
it, the right) be fundamental before anything more than rational basis
justification is required, the Court ensures that not every case will require
the “complex balancing” that heightened scrutiny entails.
Id. at 767 n.9.
72
Id. at 768.
73
Id. In a footnote to this sentence, Justice Souter observed,
Our cases have used various terms to refer to fundamental liberty interests,
and at times we have also called such an interest a “right” even before
balancing it against the government’s interest. Precision in terminology,
however, favors reserving the label “right” for instances in which the
individual’s liberty interest actually trumps the government’s countervailing
interests; only then does the individual have anything legally enforceable as
against the state’s attempt at regulation.
Id. at 768 n.10 (citations omitted).
74
Justice Souter wrote:
The claims of arbitrariness that mark almost all instances of unenumerated
substantive rights are those resting on “certain interests requir[ing]
particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to justify their
abridgment[,] [c]f. Skinner v. Oklahoma [ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535
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But his emphasis that a court must consider whether a
“legislation’s justifying principle, critically valued” is
“commensurate with the individual interest” 75 appears clearly
designed to argue that a court has flexibility in its substantive
due process analysis. That is, in order to be true to what
Justice Souter sees as the spirit and design of the
constitutional protection of liberty, while at the same time
ensuring that government is able to regulate effectively in a
complex world, he calls for an almost dialectical valuation of
the government’s interest against the particular liberty
interest at stake. 76
Of course, Justice Souter’s opinion in Glucksberg was a
concurrence, and Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion offers a
very different view of substantive due process. Under the
majority approach in Glucksberg, there are a limited number of
“fundamental rights” that can be clearly named and found,
based on objective, historical facts, to be rooted in our nation’s
tradition. 77 With regard to legislative burdens on this very
limited set of “fundamental rights,” courts will apply strict

(1942)]; Bolling v. Sharpe, [347 U.S. 497 (1954)],” [Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S.
497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)]; that is, interests in liberty
sufficiently important to be judged “fundamental,” id., at 548; see also id., at
541 (citing Corfield v. Coryell, 4 Wash. C. C. 371, 380 (CC ED Pa. 1825)). In
the face of an interest this powerful a State may not rest on threshold
rationality or a presumption of constitutionality, but may prevail only on the
ground of an interest sufficiently compelling to place within the realm of the
reasonable a refusal to recognize the individual right asserted. Poe, supra, at
548 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (an “enactment involv[ing] . . . a most
fundamental aspect of ‘liberty’ . . . [is] subjec[t] to ‘strict scrutiny’”) (quoting
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S., at 541); Reno v. Flores, 507
U.S. 292, 301-02 (1993) (reaffirming that due process “forbids the government
to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests . . . unless the infringement
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest”).
Id. at 766-67 (alterations in original) (footnote omitted).
75
Id. at 768 (emphasis added).
76
As Justice Souter put it:
Skinner, that is, added decisions regarding procreation to the list of liberties
recognized in Meyer and Pierce and loosely suggested, as a gloss on their
standard of arbitrariness, a judicial obligation to scrutinize any impingement
on such an important interest with heightened care. In so doing, it suggested
a point that Justice Harlan would develop, that the kind and degree of
justification that a sensitive judge would demand of a State would depend on
the importance of the interest being asserted by the individual.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 762 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe, 367 U.S. at 543). See
also id. at 767 (stating that a court is “to assess the relative ‘weights’ or dignities of the
contending interests”).
77
See id. at 719-28 (majority opinion).
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scrutiny (not dialectical balancing) and will almost invariably
invalidate the legislative burden. 78
But the Supreme Court’s deployment of a liberty
analysis to invalidate Texas’ sodomy law in Lawrence v. Texas 79
opened the door to a revival of Justice Souter’s more capacious
understanding of substantive due process. Professor Robert
Post observes that Justice Kennedy’s “extravagant and
passionate” opinion in Lawrence “simply shatters, with all the
heartfelt urgency of deep conviction, the paralyzing carapace in
which Glucksberg had sought to encase substantive due
And Professor Larry Tribe notes that the
process.” 80
“Glucksberg gambit” to “collapse claims of liberty into the
unidimensional and binary business of determining which
personal activities belong to the historically venerated
catalogue of privileged acts and which do not” could well have
succeeded, had future cases followed its trajectory. 81 Instead,
as Tribe notes, even the briefest examination of the Lawrence
opinion makes plain that the Court steadfastly resisted a
“reductionist procedure” that reduces the liberty interest to
“flattened-out collections of private acts.” 82
Indeed, the Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence
triggered a revival of writing on liberty, some of it from people
who had been writing and thinking about liberty for a long
time. In a sweeping and eloquent article, Professor Larry Tribe
revives his theory that the “essence of freedom” is “the selfgoverning experience of making, expressing, and renewing
one’s commitments, all the way from one’s choices with respect
to intimate relationships to one’s choices as a participating
member of a self-governing polity.” 83 Tribe’s theory is premised
on an “understanding of self-government and relational rights
as defining the core of liberty,” and on the “recognition of
coercion, and of using others as mere means to the

78
Id.
For fascinating and excellent analyses of the development of
substantive due process, and the effort by the Glucksberg majority to radically change
the trajectory of that development, see Post, supra note 61, at 86-96 and Tribe,
Lawrence, supra note 61, at 1921-25.
79
539 U.S. 558 (2003).
80
Post, supra note 61, at 96.
81
Tribe, Lawrence, supra note 61, at 1924-25.
82
Id. at 1931-32.
83
Id. at 1941.

96

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

maximization of one’s own ends, as setting the limit to liberty’s
reach.” 84
Professor Robert Post, who explored pre-New Deal
substantive due process in several articles, 85 argues that the
“[t]hemes of respect and stigma . . . at the moral center of the
Lawrence opinion” offer an entirely new dimension to
substantive due process analysis. 86 Post speculates that this
new approach may result in courts using the power of the Due
Process Clause to “prohibit[] the state from stigmatizing or
demeaning the private lives of persons.” 87 And Professor
Randy Barnett argues that the Lawrence opinion finally breaks
the post-New Deal presumption of constitutionality for any
government regulation other than that of a “fundamental
right,” and substitutes a “presumption of liberty,” which
requires some justification by the government for any
restriction it places on liberty. 88
Professor Nan Hunter was one of the first scholars to
explicitly connect the Court’s analysis in Lawrence with Justice
Souter’s concurrence in Glucksberg, and to suggest that
Lawrence may “mark[] the beginning of a substantive due
process jurisprudence that examines negative liberty limits on
state power before, or instead of, articulating a specific
standard of review.” 89 In her analysis, Hunter does not
speculate on whether she thinks this is a positive development
for liberty jurisprudence; she is agnostic on that question. I
have noted elsewhere that I believe Hunter is correct with
84

Id. at 1943. Tribe describes how, in a series of articles written in the

1970s, he
sketched a theory of why human relationships beyond the purely
instrumental—and the expressive dimensions and mutual commitments they
entail—are indispensable to the process of transmitting and transmuting
values in an intergenerational, cross-social progression that keeps faith with
a starting set of basic democratic undertakings while remaining open to
evolution in the direction of greater empathy, inclusion, and respect.
Id. at 1940-41.
85
See Robert C. Post, Defending the Lifeworld: Substantive Due Process in
the Taft Court Era, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1489 (1998); Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft
Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513 (2002).
86
Post, supra note 61, at 97-98.
87
Id. at 98.
88
Barnett, supra note 67, at 35-36 (citation omitted). Barnett carefully
distinguishes between “liberty,” which he defines as “the properly defined exercise of
freedom” which “is and always has been constrained by the rights of others” and
“license,” which is not limited by the rights of others and is therefore not a right at all.
Id. at 37.
89
Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1117 (2004).
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regard to her prediction of how the Court may proceed with
substantive due process analyses in the future. 90 But my point
here is to argue that Justice Souter’s approach is also the
appropriate one for the Court to adopt.
I recognize that some might view Justice Souter’s
approach as a death knell for important fundamental rights,
while others may view it simply as a necessary correction to
earlier substantive due process jurisprudence. But on its
merits, Justice Souter’s approach seems to me to properly
reflect the reality of our complex society while staying
consistent with the plain meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Governmental laws constantly burden liberty,
and to decide that only ones that cross a magic line called
“fundamental rights” should ever gain redress seems rigid and
inappropriate. Justice Souter’s approach permits courts to
recognize realistically and honestly the myriad ways in which
laws might burden the liberty interests of those subject to the
laws, while not necessarily invalidating the laws.
In 2002, Professor Rebecca Brown offered a
comprehensive and sophisticated analysis of the liberty
interest embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,
complete with a vigorous defense of the courts’ responsibility to
protect such liberty, an explanation of how such judicial review
is consistent with, not destructive of, democracy and a
framework for considering liberty claims. 91 In explaining why
protecting liberty interests is as important a constitutional goal
as protecting equality interests, Brown observed:
[I]n a world of increasingly diverse personal and moral values,
supporting very different notions of the good life, the communion of
interests between representatives and represented can degrade even
when laws nominally operate evenhandedly. For example, laws that
provide that “no one may [blank]” can exploit difference as effectively
as a classification, when the blank is an activity that “we,” the

90
Chai R. Feldblum, The Right to Define One’s Own Concept of Existence:
What Lawrence Can Mean for Intersex and Transgender People, 7 GEO. J. GENDER & L.
115, 120 (2006) [hereinafter Feldblum, Right to Define] (describing liberty analysis in
Lawrence). See also Chai Feldblum, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Comments
at From Griswold to Lawrence and Beyond: The Battle over Personal Privacy and the
New Supreme Court (Mar. 2, 2006) (transcript available at http://pewforum.org/
events/index.php?EventID=95).
91
See Rebecca Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491
(2002).
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political ins, have no wish to do, but that “they,” the outs, claim a
profound need to do in pursuit of personal fulfillment. 92

Brown uses laws prohibiting sodomy or assisted suicide
as principal examples of the need to question a legislature’s
reasons for burdening liberty. 93 But the same framework that
Brown proffers to scrutinize such prohibitions should apply as
well to a legislature’s prohibition of discriminatory conduct
that might adversely impact a regulated person’s liberty. The
fact that we might need to be concerned in the coming decades
with the potential liberty burdens imposed by a sexual
orientation anti-discrimination law or a marriage equality law
(rather than with the liberty burdens posed by a criminal
sodomy law or a law that excludes same-sex couples from civil
marriage) simply reflects the reality that moral values are
beginning to shift in this country—as I believe they should.
Finally, in thinking about the type of liberties that rise
to the level of requiring more searching government
justification, I believe it is helpful to group the spectrum of
liberty interests into three broad categories: bodily liberty,
identity liberty and belief liberty. There is nothing magical
about these categories, and I do not contend they are the only
ones that make sense.
But I believe this three-part
categorization is an intellectually coherent manner in which to
think about the spectrum of liberty interests that the Supreme
Court has protected over the decades. 94
Bodily liberty is the easiest one to describe: the State
should not invade the integrity of our bodies without a good

92

Id. at 1498.
Id. at 1545-49.
94
This categorization also permits us to think more logically about whether
such liberties are inherently and solely negative liberties that prohibit the government
from restraining some action on our parts, or whether they are also inherently positive
liberties that require some affirmative action on the part of the government to allow for
their full expression. Obviously, the Supreme Court, for the moment, has come down
clearly on the side that the liberty protected by the substantive Due Process Clause is
solely a negative liberty. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). But in many circumstances, the only way to achieve real
liberty for some individuals will be for the government to take affirmative steps to
bring about that liberty—even if such steps might then interfere with the liberty of
others.
See, e.g., ROBIN L. WEST, RE-IMAGINING JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE
INTERPRETATIONS OF FORMAL EQUALITY, RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 6-7 (2003)
(describing the need for government to affirmatively support the ability of individuals
to give and receive care and to feel safe); Feldblum, Right to Define, supra note 90, at
127-39 (noting affirmative steps government should take to protect the liberty of
intersex and transgender people); West, supra note 61, passim (describing affirmative
steps to be taken by government to ensure the liberty of women).
93
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reason for doing so. 95 Protecting members of the public from
contagious diseases is a good reason to force someone to have
his body invaded through a vaccination; fighting drug crime is
not a good enough reason to force someone to vomit by
pumping an emetic solution through a tube into his stomach. 96
Identity liberty is the term I would use to describe the
liberty that the Casey plurality sought to capture in its
“mystery of human life” description, a description repeated by
Justice Kennedy in the Lawrence majority:
These matters [personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education],
involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of
existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human
life. 97

Despite Justice Scalia’s scoffing at this description as
meaningless for purposes of law, 98 I think it accurately
captures a set of liberty interests that go to the core of a
person’s identity. This may be a person’s identity as a parent
(including the decisions whether to have a child and how to
raise the child), a person’s identity as a spouse or a lover
(deciding what form of sexual intimacy one wishes to engage
in), a person’s racial, ethnic, or religious identity or a person’s
gender identity. As I have previously observed:
Not that many personal decisions rise to the level of “defin[ing] one’s
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the

95
See, e.g., Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Jacobson v.
Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).
96
Compare Jacobson, 197 U.S. at 26-27 (holding compulsory vaccination
within police powers), with Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-74 (holding unconstitutional the
forcible administration of emetic solution to induce vomiting in course of drug
investigation).
97
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). See also
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574 (2003) (relying on and quoting Casey when
finding unconstitutional laws criminalizing consensual homosexual sex).
98
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“And if the Court is
referring not to the holding of Casey, but to the dictum of its famed sweet-mystery-oflife passage (‘At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence,
of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life’): That ‘casts some doubt’
upon either the totality of our jurisprudence or else (presumably the right answer)
nothing at all. I have never heard of a law that attempted to restrict one’s ‘right to
define’ certain concepts; and if the passage calls into question the government’s power
to regulate actions based on one’s self-defined ‘concept of existence, etc.,’ it is the
passage that ate the rule of law.”).
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mystery of human life.” We should not let the lofty rhetoric mislead
us to the conclusion that these words can mean everything and
anything. They do not. The examples provided by the Lawrence
majority give meaning to the type of personal decisions at play
here—the choice to marry, the choice to have a child (or not have a
child), the choice to have sexual intimacy with a partner, the choice
to raise a child in a certain fashion. These are not small decisions.
These are those big decisions in life that go to the core, essential
aspects of our selves. 99

Moreover, while the phrasing of the “mystery of human
life” sentence reflects a twenty-first century language of human
self-awareness, a similar sentiment regarding the importance
of self-identity seems to underlie one of the Court’s earliest
descriptions of the liberty interest, in Meyer v. Nebraska:
While this court has not attempted to define with exactness the
liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received much consideration
and some of the included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also
the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the
common occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. 100

What was recognized at common law as essential to the
“orderly pursuit of happiness by free men” 101 is no doubt
different from what would be recognized as such today. But
the underlying objective of the standard is the same—
identifying an area of core identity liberty for which the
government needs a good reason if it is going to infringe on
such identity.
Finally, I use the category belief liberty to refer to one’s
liberty to possess deeply held personal beliefs without coercion
or penalty by the State. Belief liberty presumably could be
subsumed under identity liberty, since our beliefs are very
often constitutive of our identities. But I believe it is worth
identifying this type of liberty separately because it is so often
conflated with First Amendment rights to free speech, free
expression and free exercise of religion. That conflation is

99
Feldblum, Right to Define, supra note 90, at 139. Larry Tribe’s project on
liberty, with its focus on self-government and relational rights, captures incredibly well
what I call identity liberty. Tribe, Lawrence, supra note 61, at 1941-44.
100
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (emphasis added).
101
Id.
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understandable; most cases dealing with “beliefs” naturally
arise under the First Amendment. But is it necessary that
such beliefs be protected solely under the First Amendment?
Certainly, the ability to believe what one will seems “essential
to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men [and
women].” 102
The First Amendment right to free speech necessarily
protects any speech, no matter how trivial. The First
Amendment right to free exercise necessarily protects (within
the limits of current Supreme Court doctrine) any religious
belief, no matter how trivial. By contrast, I believe it is
appropriate that the belief liberty protected under the Due
Process Clause be limited to those beliefs that occupy a position
of significant importance to the individual. Even if those
beliefs are not so constitutive of the person’s identity as to be
protected under “identity liberty,” the “mystery of human life”
description of identity liberty can offer us guidance regarding
what type of beliefs demand more searching scrutiny when a
burden on such beliefs is alleged.
Obviously, we all have many beliefs. If the government
had to justify every burden on every belief caused by every law,
it would presumably have little time to do anything else. But,
certainly, we are capable of placing these beliefs in some sort of
hierarchy. For example, I believe that heterosexuality and
homosexuality are morally neutral characteristics (similar to
having red hair or brown hair), and I believe that acting
consistently with one’s sexual orientation is a morally good act.
I also believe that flowers are necessary to happiness and that
Star Trek is a great contribution to our culture. But I would
rank my beliefs regarding sexuality as much more significant
to my sense of self than my beliefs regarding flowers or Star
Trek. Thus, in order for belief liberty to be situated at a point
in the spectrum that requires greater government justification
for infringement, such beliefs must constitute an important
core aspect of the individual. 103

102

Id.
As Justice Souter was at pains to argue in his concurrence, “the kind and
degree of justification that a sensitive judge would demand of a State would depend on
the importance of the interest being asserted by the individual.” Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). See also id. at 767 (“[A] court [is] to
assess the relative ‘weights’ or dignities of the contending interests . . . .”). There is no
reason to presume that this same analysis could not be applied to the relative weights
103
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Analyzing belief liberty under the Due Process Clause
(and not simply under the First Amendment) serves an
additional useful purpose. An individual’s deeply held beliefs
may derive from religious sources, from purely secular sources
or from spiritual sources that are not traditionally viewed as
religious. If these beliefs are an integral part of the person’s
sense of self, my argument is that they constitute belief liberty.
The particular source of the individual’s beliefs is not the
barometer of their importance for due process purposes. For
belief liberty, the source of the beliefs (be it faith in God, belief
in spiritual energy or a conviction of the rational five senses)
has no relevance. A belief derived from a religious faith should
be accorded no more weight—and no less weight—than a belief
derived from a non-religious source.
As the Supreme Court reflected on a somewhat related
question in 1944:
If by this position appellant seeks for freedom of conscience a
broader protection than for freedom of the mind, it may be doubted
that any of the great liberties insured by the First Article can be
given higher place than the others. All have preferred position in
our basic scheme. All are interwoven there together. Differences
there are, in them and in the modes appropriate for their exercise.
But they have unity in the charter’s prime place because they have
unity in their human sources and functionings. Heart and mind are
not identical. Intuitive faith and reasoned judgment are not the
same. Spirit is not always thought. But in the everyday business of
living, secular or otherwise, these variant aspects of personality find
inseparable expression in a thousand ways.
They cannot be
altogether parted in law more than in life. 104

b. Burdening Belief by Regulating Conduct
To understand the burden that an LGBT equality law
might place on some people’s belief liberty, one must start by
acknowledging that a State necessarily takes a position of
moral neutrality on sexual orientation when it passes such a
law. For that reason, the logical underpinning of such a law
will be at odds with the belief systems of some individuals who
are subject to the law.
of beliefs. Thus, although Justice Souter makes no claim regarding belief liberty in his
concurrence, I believe my approach is consonant with his analysis.
104
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 164-65 (1944) (citations omitted).
In Prince, the appellant was seeking a higher degree of protection for her religious
beliefs than would have been accorded secular beliefs under the First Amendment. See
id. at 164.
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But, obviously, such a law does not require individuals
subject to the law to change their beliefs. An employer who is
required to hire a gay person or a hotel owner who is required
to rent to a gay couple may continue to believe whatever he or
she wishes about the immorality or sinfulness of
homosexuality.
To grasp the full impact of such laws,
therefore, it is necessary to explicate and acknowledge the
logical intertwining that many people (including religious
people) experience between their conduct and their beliefs such
that compliance with a neutral civil rights law may burden
their belief liberty.
Obviously, in a complex society, conduct must be
regulated in a way that belief need not be. That is a truism.
From the Supreme Court’s ringing protection of belief in West
Virginia v. Barnette 105 to its consistent refrain that religious
beliefs will be protected in a manner that religious conduct will
not be, 106 the logical distinction between conduct and belief has
been clear.
But it does not follow from that truism that conduct
should always be viewed as completely apart and distinct from
belief.
Certainly, courts have recognized that particular
conduct may be used to communicate an expressive belief. 107
Why should it be so difficult to accept that engaging in certain
conduct (or being precluded from engaging in certain conduct)
will undermine an individual’s strongly held beliefs?
Indeed, I would argue that gay people—of all
individuals—should recognize the injustice of forcing a person
to disaggregate belief or identity from practice. For years, gay
people have been told by some entities that they should
separate their status from their conduct. In the religious
arena, this is framed as “loving the sinner, but hating the sin.”
105

319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (“If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by
word or act their faith therein. If there are any circumstances which permit an
exception, they do not now occur to us.”).
106
The Supreme Court has often observed that while there is an absolute
right to hold religious beliefs, see, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214, 219
(1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940), religiously grounded conduct
is not absolutely protected, see, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986); Yoder, 406
U.S. at 220; Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603 (1961).
107
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405-06 (1989) (stating that flag
burning as a political statement constitutes expressive conduct); Spence v. Washington,
418 U.S. 405, 409-10 (1974) (stating that the display of a flag bearing a peace symbol is
constitutionally protected expressive conduct); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
376-77 (1968) (recognizing that symbolic conduct is constitutionally protected).
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That is, gay people have been told that their status as
individuals with homosexual orientation is not inherently
sinful—but that if they act in a way consistent with that
orientation, then they are engaging in sin.
In the legal arena, this approach to a gay person’s
identity and being has been framed as the “status/conduct”
distinction. Particularly as a means of dealing with the
holding in Hardwick, some legal advocates have argued that
their clients should not be discriminated against for the status
of being gay, although they have deliberately failed to claim
equal non-discrimination rights for their clients’ rights to
engage in gay conduct. 108 From the moment I became aware of
this legal approach, I have detested it and argued against it. 109
It seemed to me the height of disingenuousness, absurdity and
indeed disrespect, to tell someone it is permissible to “be” gay,
but not permissible to engage in gay sex. What do they think
being gay means?
I have the same reaction to those who blithely assume a
religious person can easily disengage her religious belief and
self-identity from her religious practice and religious behavior.
What do they think being religious means? Of course, at some
basic level, religion is about a set of beliefs. But for many
religious people across many religious denominations (Catholic,
Protestant, Jewish and Muslim—to note just the ones I have
some personal understanding of), the day-to-day practice of
one’s religion is an essential way of bringing meaning to such
beliefs. And while religious beliefs on homosexuality may seem
the most familiar to us, there may be people with strongly held
secular beliefs who feel just as strongly on the issue.

108
See Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, supra note 20, at 290-96 (detailing cases
in which the “status-conduct” distinction has been used). As I noted in that article:

Instead of countering the ramifications of Hardwick by decoupling sodomy
and homosexual conduct, many gay rights attorneys have implicitly accepted
the equivalence between homosexual conduct and homosexual sodomy and
have instead sought to decouple homosexual orientation from homosexual
conduct. This approach has produced victories in court for a few individual
gay and lesbian plaintiffs, but at a cost to equal protection for gay people
generally, and at a potential cost to the development of a more effective
paradigm for equal rights for gay people.
Id. at 290.
109
See id. at 290-96; Chai Feldblum, Based on a Moral Vision: The Majority in
Romer v. Evans Could—and Should—Have Engaged the Dissent Directly on the Role of
Popular Morality in Making Laws, LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at S31; Chai R.
Feldblum, Keep the Sex in Same-Sex Marriage, 4 HARV. GAY & LESBIAN REV. 23 (1997).
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Given this perspective, it makes sense to me that three
born-again Christians who run a chain of sports and health
clubs would feel that “[t]heir fundamentalist religious
convictions require them to act in accordance with the
teachings of Jesus Christ and the will of God in their business
as well as in their personal lives,” and hence mandate them to
hire only employees who conform to their views about proper
sexual behavior. 110 It also makes sense to me that these same
owners would feel their religion compels them to have these
employees “talk[] to homosexuals about their religious views
and sexual preference and [tell] them homosexuality [is]
wrong.” 111 And I can well understand the elderly Christian
woman who believes “God will judge her if she permits people
to engage in sex outside of marriage in her rental units and
that if she does so, she will be prevented from meeting her
deceased husband in the hereafter.” 112
Whether such conduct should legitimately be permitted
in a workplace or a public accommodation is a separate
question. But at this stage of the analysis, we should be
concerned solely with whether a burden on belief liberty exists,
not whether the burden is justified. The relevant question at
this stage is how a court or a legislature should respond to an
allegation that engaging in certain conduct, in compliance with
a neutral law, burdens an individual’s beliefs that constitute a
core aspect of that individual’s sense of self.
My argument is that we should err on the side of
accepting the person’s allegation for purposes of deciding
whether a burden on liberty exists. (Again, this is different
from the subsequent step of deciding whether the burden on
liberty is ultimately justified.) In erring on the side of the
person making the allegation, there must of course be some
basis to the person’s claim that will situate the belief liberty
interest on the upper end of the liberty spectrum. That is, the
person must demonstrate that he or she holds a particular
belief that is core to his or her sense of self and must make a
credible claim that engaging in certain conduct would be
inconsistent with that belief. But beyond that, I do not believe
110

McClure v. Sports & Health Club, 370 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Minn. 1985) (en

banc).
111

Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, 373 N.W.2d 784, 787 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985), aff’d, 389 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 1986).
112
Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal.
1996).
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the government acts appropriately when it second-guesses the
individual and concludes, for example, “Really, this isn’t such a
burden on your belief.”
Many judges have been unsympathetic to religious
individuals’ claims that a neutral law burdens their religious
beliefs. As I describe below, sometimes judges wrap the
justification for the burden into the analysis of whether a
burden exists in the first place. Sometimes judges creatively
construe a law so as to result in the absence of a burden and
sometimes judges simply dismiss the religious person’s
allegation that a burden exists.
For example, in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing
Commission, the Supreme Court of California considered
whether a housing law that prohibited discrimination based on
marital status imposed a “significant burden” on a religious
landlady who did not wish to rent to an unmarried,
heterosexual couple. 113 The court concluded that no such
significant burden existed because the landlady could invest
her capital in an enterprise other than housing. 114 The court
also noted that the landlady’s religious beliefs did not “require
her to rent apartments; the religious injunction is simply that
she not rent to unmarried couples.” 115 In light of that fact, the
court concluded: “No religious exercise is burdened if she
follows the alternative course of placing her capital in another
investment.” 116
113

Id. at 918-19. As I note in the text, the woman in this case was afraid she
would not see her husband in the hereafter if she rented to the unmarried couple. See
supra note 112. The court used the formulation of a “significant burden” because it
was applying the standard set forth in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Smith,
913 P.2d at 919.
114
Id. at 926. The court was contrasting the burden on a religious person who
lost his or her job because of a refusal to work on the Sabbath and who then sought
unemployment compensation:
[T]he degree of compulsion involved is markedly greater in the
unemployment-compensation cases than in the case before us. In the former
instance, one can avoid the conflict between the law and one’s beliefs about
the Sabbath only by quitting work and foregoing compensation. To do so,
however, is not a realistic solution for someone who lives on the wages earned
through personal labor. In contrast, one who earns a living through the
return on capital invested in rental properties can, if she does not wish to
comply with an antidiscrimination law that conflicts with her religious
beliefs, avoid the conflict, without threatening her livelihood, by selling her
units and redeploying the capital in other investments.
Id.
115
116

Id. at 926.
Id.
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A similar analysis was advanced by a dissenting judge
in Donahue v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, 117 a
state court ruling in California that also concerned a religious
couple who did not wish to rent to unmarried, cohabiting
heterosexual couples. In concluding that the burden on the
couple’s religious conduct was slight, the dissenting judge first
observed that the couple “d[id] not contend that refusing to
rent to unmarried cohabitants is a central tenet of their
religious belief,” nor did they “contend that the burden imposed
by the statute prohibits them from practicing their religion.” 118
Rather, the couple’s only contention, observed the dissenting
judge, was that “if they are compelled to rent to unmarried
cohabitants, they would be—in effect—aiders and abettors in
the commission of sin by others in violation of their own
religious beliefs.” 119
The dissenting judge was unsympathetic to this
concern. As the judge concluded:
The Donahues are the owners of a five-unit apartment building
which they rent to members of the general public. They are engaged
in secular commercial conduct performed for profit. There are no
religious motivations for their conduct. The statute does not require
the Donahues to aid and abet “sinners,” it merely requires them “to
act in a nondiscriminatory manner toward all prospective [tenants].
A legal compulsion . . . to refrain from discriminating against
[prospective tenants] on the basis of [marital status] can hardly be
characterized as an endorsement” or the aiding or abetting of sin. 120

In the case involving born-again Christians who owned
and operated a chain of sports and health clubs in Minneapolis,
a Minnesota court found no burden on the owners’ religious
beliefs by offering a creative interpretation of the State’s gay
civil rights law. The court observed that “based on his
understanding of the Bible, Owens [the owner of the clubs] (the
117

2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). For subsequent appellate history of
this case, see infra note 120.
118
Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49 (Grignon, J., dissenting).
119
Id.
120
Id. (quoting Pines v. Tomson, 160 Cal. App. 3d 370, 389 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984)) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). The Donahue majority found a
burden on the couple’s free exercise of religion, as prohibited by the state constitution,
and that the State did not have a sufficiently compelling interest in prohibiting marital
status discrimination to override that exercise of religion. Id. at 46 (majority opinion).
The opinion in Donahue was superseded by an order granting review, 825 P.2d 766
(Cal. 1992); the review was then dismissed and the case remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal.
1993). The case of Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm’n, 913 P.2d 909, 912
(Cal. 1996), discussed supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text, was decided three
years after Donahue was remanded.
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other principals agree with him) clearly is opposed to
For example, quoting from the trial
homosexual acts.” 121
transcript, the court noted that Owens had emphasized that,
with regard to homosexuals, he has “a love, a heartfelt love for
them, but not for the activity. The same way I would have a
heartfelt love for anybody; but as God says in his word, we can
hate the sin but we love the sinner.” 122
But, the court observed, the Minneapolis ordinance
prohibited discrimination “based on affectional preference, not
acts.” 123 Thus, the court concluded: “From [Owens’] words it
would be difficult to conclude that his Christianity supports
discrimination based on preference rather than acts. Thus, the
Minneapolis ordinance as applied in this case does not impose
a burden upon Owens’ free exercise of religion.” 124
In other words, because the State’s civil rights law
prohibited discrimination solely on gay “status,” and not on gay
“conduct,” the obligation on the owners not to discriminate on
the basis of “affectional preference” could logically have no
impact on their belief that homosexual conduct was immoral.
In fact, the State’s law seemed perfectly matched to the owners’
beliefs in loving the sinner, but hating the sin.
Of course, the fact that most of the gay men frequenting
the sports and health club were presumably also having gay
sex at some point was ignored by the court. Thus, the court’s
analysis, while offering an ironic twist on the status-conduct
distinction, seems as riddled with illogic as when the
distinction is applied in gay rights cases.
Some of the more sophisticated judicial analyses of the
possible burden that civil rights laws place on religious beliefs
are represented in the various opinions issued in Gay Rights
Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown
University. 125 This case concerned the refusal of Georgetown
University, a Jesuit school, to recognize gay student groups
that had organized at the University and the Law School. 126
The university administration permitted the gay student

121
Blanding v. Sports & Health Club, 373 N.W.2d 784, 791 (Minn. Ct. App.
1985), aff’d, 389 N.W.2d 206 (Minn. 1986).
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id.
125
536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
126
Id. at 8-14.
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groups to exist and to use various school facilities. 127 However,
the administration drew the line at “endorsing” the student
groups. If it allowed the groups to use the Georgetown name,
receive university funds and have access to subsidized office
space, telephone service, office supplies and equipment, the
administration felt it would be connoting its endorsement of
the groups. 128 As the administration explained:
This situation involves a controversial matter of faith and the moral
teachings of the Catholic Church. “Official” subsidy and support of a
gay student organization would be interpreted by many as
endorsement of the positions taken by the gay movement on a full
range of issues. While the University supports and cherishes the
individual lives and rights of its students it will not subsidize this
cause. Such an endorsement would be inappropriate for a Catholic
University. 129

Judge Pryor’s concurrence provides a good example of a
judge simply not accepting the allegations of a religious person
(or, in this case, a religious institution):
I do not understand Georgetown to argue that discrimination
against any persons or groups is a tenet of its faith. Rather, it
claims that providing the disputed facilities and services to the gay
student organizations infringes the University’s religious interest in
embracing a particular doctrine of sexual ethics. Therefore, to
require the University to make available its facilities and services in
an even-handed manner works, at most, an indirect infringement of
its religious interest. For just as enforcement of the prohibition
against discrimination on the basis of political affiliation does not
signify endorsement of any particular political party, enforcement of
the Human Rights Act’s ban on discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation does not signify endorsement by the government or by
the covered entity of any particular doctrine of sexual ethics. 130

In contrast to Judge Pryor’s concurrence, the plurality
opinion in the Georgetown case parsed the situation somewhat
differently—acknowledging that D.C.’s law did place some
burden on the University, but nevertheless refusing to accept
fully the University’s allegations with regard to that burden.
The plurality first interpreted the D.C. Human Rights Act
(which prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation)
127

See id. at 10.
Id. at 11-12.
129
Id. (quoting Memorandum from Dean W. Schuerman, Georgetown Univ., to
the Student Government, Georgetown Univ. (Feb. 6, 1979) (emphasis added by the
Court)).
130
Id. at 45 (Pryor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
128
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as not requiring that any covered entity, including Georgetown
University, endorse a gay group. 131 The plurality concluded:
“[T]he Human Rights Act does not require one private actor to
‘endorse’ the ideas or conduct of another.” 132
Instead, the plurality focused on the “mere” conduct
required by the law:
While the Human Rights Act does not seek to compel uniformity in
philosophical attitudes by force of law, it does require equal
treatment. Equality of treatment in educational institutions is
concretely measured by nondiscriminatory provision of access to
“facilities and services.” . . . Georgetown’s refusal to provide tangible
benefits without regard to sexual orientation violated the Human
Rights Act.
To that extent only, we consider the merits of
Georgetown’s free exercise defense. 133

Thus, the plurality held that the D.C. law required that
the University simply engage in the conduct of providing funds,
facilities and services in an even-handed manner to the gay
student groups. The plurality then simply asserted that
providing such funds, facilities and services did not translate
into an endorsement of the groups’ beliefs on sexual ethics,
despite the University’s clear statement that it viewed
precisely such actions as connoting endorsement. 134
A classic mark of judges who downplay the burden on
religious people who are forced to engage in certain conduct is
an unwillingness to err on the side of accepting the allegation
that conduct can impair belief. For those of us who believe that
government should err on the side of accepting such allegations
(whether the allegation is that engaging in certain conduct will
impair a person’s religiously based belief or secularly based
belief), the Court’s decision in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic
& Institutional Rights, Inc. (“FAIR”) 135 was particularly
troubling.
The core argument of the law schools and law faculty in
Rumsfeld v. FAIR was that forcing the schools to act in a
131

Gay Rights Coal. of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., 536 A.2d at 16 (plurality

opinion).
132

Id. at 17.
Id. at 5 (quoting D.C. CODE § 1-2520 (1987)).
134
The plurality, unlike Judge Pryor, then accepted that there was a burden
on the school in forcing the University to provide tangible benefits to the student
groups (albeit a less minor burden than an forced endorsement would have been), and
that the burden was outweighed by the State’s compelling interest in prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation. Id. at 38.
135
___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (2006).
133
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certain way burdened their freedom of speech and freedom of
expressive association. 136 The cavalier manner in which the
Court treated FAIR’s allegations does not bode well for future
claims made by those who feel their religious or secular beliefs
are being burdened when they are forced to comply with
neutral civil rights laws. 137
In FAIR, the law schools and law faculty claimed that
the government burdened their freedom of speech and their
freedom of expressive association 138 by requiring that they treat
military recruiters better than other recruiters who
discriminate based on sexual orientation. 139 The schools and
faculty argued that while military recruitment was a
compelling government interest, forcing the schools to treat
military recruiters similarly to other recruiters (with no
symbolic or logistical differences to convey the schools’
136

Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1303.
Indeed, it was precisely the fear that people who wished to discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation or gender or race would use the argument that
complying with a civil rights law burdened their freedom of expression that made so
many gay rights and civil rights advocates welcome the result in the FAIR decision.
See, e.g., Brief of Prof. William Alford et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at
21-22, FAIR, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152), available at http://www.law.
georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/FAIRamicusHarvard.pdf (urging the Court to
decide the case on statutory rather than constitutional grounds, to avoid providing
constitutional shelter to those seeking to evade anti-discrimination laws); Jack Balkin,
All’s FAIR in Law and War, BALKINIZATION, Mar. 15, 2006, http://balkin.blogspot.com/
2006/03/alls-fair-in-law-and-war.html (discussing the problems the law schools’
possible success in FAIR would pose for the enforceability of anti-discrimination laws);
Dale Carpenter, Balkin on Solomon, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY, Mar. 15, 2006,
http://www.volokh.com/posts/1142448786.shtml (same). As I explain further infra, I
believe the result in FAIR was both wrong and unfortunate. Moreover, I do not believe
a contrary result would have given carte blanche to those who wish to discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation, gender, race, or any other ground. It would, however,
have ensured that the burdens that neutral civil rights laws place on those who
disagree with the premises of such laws would have been made more transparent,
would have been accorded some recognition, and would have been justified in the legal
process.
138
See Brief for the Respondents at 16-33, FAIR, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1297
(No. 04-1152).
139
As a general matter, law firms and law organizations that do not attest to
the fact that they do not discriminate on the basis of sex, race, religion, national origin,
disability, or sexual orientation are not provided assistance by law schools in the
recruitment process. See Assoc. of Am. Law Sch., Executive Comm. Regulations, Reg.
6-3.1, http://www.aals.org/about_handbook_regulations.php#6 (last visited Oct. 4, 2006)
(requiring, in order to enforce the Association of American Law Schools’ (“AALS”) antidiscrimination by-laws, employers who recruit at law schools to provide written
assurance that they do not discriminate on any of the grounds prohibited in AALS’ bylaws); see also Brief of Nat’l Ass’n for Law Placement et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 2, 5, FAIR, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 1297 (No. 04-1152), available at
http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/FAIRamicusNALP.pdf (discussing
same policy).
137
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disapproval of the military’s recruitment policy) was not
narrowly tailored to fit the compelling government interest of
military recruitment. 140
What exactly was the burden about which the schools
and faculty were complaining? Obviously, the government was
not requiring that the law schools pronounce their support for
the statutory policy of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” which set the
parameters of military recruitment and which prohibited the
recruitment of openly gay law students as JAG Corps officers.
No such speech was being coerced. Nor was the government
prohibiting schools from loudly expressing their belief that
appropriate legal recruitment would place no weight on the
sexual orientation of law students. To the extent that a school
viewed itself as creating an expressive community based on
such a view of justice, the government was not standing in its
way.
The “only” thing the government was requiring from the
law schools was a simple act of conduct: it was requiring that
schools treat military recruiters equally to all other recruiters,
even though the law schools viewed the military recruiters as
advancing, and possibly embodying, an unjust and perhaps
immoral position. Where was the burden in requiring such
conduct? 141
As with some religious people’s claims that the act of
complying with a neutral civil rights law burdens their
religious beliefs, the answer lies in the inherent entangling
between conduct and practice in some situations.
In most situations, of course, conduct is not intended to
convey expression. For that reason, one does not ordinarily feel
140

Brief for the Respondents, supra note 138, at 18, 44-48.
As the Supreme Court put it: “The Solomon Amendment neither limits
what law schools may say nor requires them to say anything. . . . As a general matter,
the Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech. It affects what law schools
must do—afford equal access to military recruiters—not what they may or may not
say.” FAIR, ___ U.S. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1307. Although the manner in which the
government obtained compliance from the law schools was via the threat of
withholding funds, the Supreme Court concluded that the government could have
demanded such compliance directly without violating the Federal Constitution. Id.
For that reason, it was irrelevant that the government used the method of conditioning
conduct on the receipt of spending. Id. (“This case does not require us to determine
when a condition placed on university funding goes beyond the ‘reasonable’ choice
offered in Grove City [College v. Bell] and becomes an unconstitutional condition. It is
clear that a funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if it could be constitutionally
imposed directly. Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from
directly imposing the Solomon Amendment’s access requirement, the statute does not
place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt of federal funds.” (citation omitted)).
141
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that a requirement to engage in certain conduct (or not to
engage in certain conduct) necessarily undermines one’s
identity or beliefs. We engage in innumerable acts throughout
the day. We might get on the subway in the morning, buy a
newspaper, order lunch, give an exam or take an exam, fix a
car, buy stock or feed a baby. We rarely experience ourselves
as expressing a belief system when we engage in these forms of
conduct. Beliefs may underlie our actions (for example, public
transportation is good; newspapers should be supported; babies
should be cared for); but it is rare that we experience our
conduct (or our lack of engaging in certain conduct) as
inherently intertwined with our beliefs and identities.
But that is not always the case. Sometimes being forced
to engage in certain conduct—or being precluded from
engaging in certain conduct—will impinge on our beliefs or
identities. This is not an overly difficult situation to perceive.
It is certainly not beyond the sophistication of a legislature or a
court to ascertain. It requires that an individual articulate a
particular belief or identity, and then articulate how being
forced to engage in an act (or how being prohibited from
engaging in an act) will interfere with, or will undermine, that
belief or identity.
This is precisely the situation that the law schools and
law faculty faced in FAIR. The schools and faculty experienced
the “mere” conduct of assisting military recruiters as
undermining their expressive beliefs. The members of FAIR
held two expressive beliefs: first, that law students should be
hired without regard to their sexual orientation, and second,
that aiding and abetting any recruiter who took sexual
orientation into account in hiring was unjust. Thus, a mandate
by the government that the schools assist military recruiters
who did not hire openly gay law students was experienced by
the schools as burdening that second belief. Because the belief
itself related to conduct (i.e., it is unjust to aid and abet a
discriminatory recruiter), the mandate to engage in certain
conduct (i.e., treat military recruiters the same as other
recruiters) necessarily burdened that belief.
The Supreme Court got around this difficulty by simply
refusing to accept that the government’s requirement that the
law schools engage in certain conduct burdened their
expressive beliefs—much as some judges simply refuse to
accept that a requirement to engage in certain conduct burdens
the religious beliefs of an individual or an institution. The
Court first recast the schools’ argument as a concern that
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assisting military recruiters would mean that students would
get confused and would not be able to differentiate the military
recruiters’ message from the schools’ message.
To that
contrived concern, the Court wryly responded: “We have held
that high school students can appreciate the difference between
speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits because
legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.
Surely students have not lost that ability by the time they get
to law school.” 142
The schools’ actual concern—that simply engaging in
the conduct of hosting the military recruiters undermines the
schools’ expressive belief in non-discrimination—was simply
dismissed by the Court in a conclusory manner:
To comply with the [Solomon Amendment], law schools must allow
military recruiters on campus and assist them in whatever way the
school chooses to assist other employers. Law schools therefore
“associate” with military recruiters in the sense that they interact
with them. But recruiters are not part of the law school. Recruiters
are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited
purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the
school’s expressive association. This distinction is critical. Unlike
the public accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment
does not force a law school “to accept members it does not desire.” 143

Thus, the Court asserted that the conduct of associating
with military recruiters who are not members of the school did
not undermine the law schools’ expressive beliefs. The fact
that the law schools experienced the association as causing
precisely that result was simply ignored by the Court and
dismissed.
Religious employers who do not want to provide health
benefits to same-sex couples and religious schools who do not
want to provide funding for gay rights groups might view
themselves as far removed from law schools that do not wish to
assist military recruiters who discriminate against gay law
students. But the parallels between the two groups are stark:
In each case, an individual or an institution experiences the
coerced conduct (the “equality mandate”) as burdening its
beliefs. And in each case, the individual or institution runs the
risk that the State and the courts will simply dismiss its
experience of burden as not real.
142

Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1310 (citations omitted).
Id. at ___, 126 S. Ct. at 1312 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S.
640, 648 (2000)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143
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Justifying the Burden on Belief Liberty

It may be cold comfort to those with strongly held beliefs
regarding the immorality and sinfulness of homosexuality that
I argue that the burden on their belief liberty should be
acknowledged. After all, as I note in the beginning of this
article and as I hope to make clear in this section, I believe it
will rarely be the case that a court should use the Due Process
Clause to insert an exemption to an LGBT equality law in
order to accommodate the belief liberty of those who are
regulated by the law. 144
As Justice Souter contended in his Glucksberg
concurrence, a court should not intervene “merely to identify a
reasonable resolution of contending values that differs from the
terms of the legislation under review.” 145 Rather, “[i]t is only
when the legislation’s justifying principle, critically valued, is
so far from being commensurate with the individual interest as
to be arbitrarily or pointlessly applied that the statute must
give way.” 146
Under this approach, I find it difficult to envision any
circumstance in which a court could legitimately conclude that
a legislature that has passed a LGBT equality law, with no
exceptions for individual religious people based on belief
liberty, has acted arbitrarily or pointlessly. If the “justifying
principle” of the legislation is to protect the liberty of LGBT
people to live freely and safely in all parts of society, it is
perfectly reasonable for a legislature not to provide any
exemption that will cordon off a significant segment of society
from the anti-discrimination prohibition. This may not be the
result a particular judge might have reached were she in the
legislature, but it is certainly a “reasonable resolution of
contending values” for a legislature to have reached.
Nevertheless, I believe explicating the burden that such
civil rights laws may place on some individuals’ belief liberty is
still worthwhile. While a court should not be permitted to restrike a balance between competing liberties when the balance
already struck by the legislature is reasonable, that does not
144
To the extent that any equality law regulated belief directly, it should be
held invalid under the First Amendment. To the extent that forced compliance with an
equality mandate burdened an individual’s belief liberty, my argument in this section
is that such a burden is likely to be justified.
145
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 712, 768 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring).
146
Id.
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mean the legislature should not choose to place certain
exemptions in the law at the outset.
The utility in
acknowledging the burdens on belief liberty that might arise
from the application of civil rights laws is that advocates of
such laws might see their way to deciding that the legislature
should protect belief liberty in a limited set of circumstances.
Indeed, the best outcome would be for such decisions to be
made in a negotiated setting with those whose beliefs will be
adversely impacted by the law.
It probably seems dangerous to advocates of LGBT
equality to acknowledge that a civil rights law might burden
the liberty of those who are regulated by the law. This is
because laws prohibiting discrimination based on sexual
orientation that have been held to burden a constitutionally
protected right have not fared well in Supreme Court
jurisprudence thus far. 147 The Supreme Court’s opinion in Boy
Scouts of America v. Dale, 148 creating an exemption for the Boy
Scouts of America to New Jersey’s law prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation, is the classic
example.
In Dale, the Court spent the bulk of its opinion
explaining why it agreed with the Boy Scouts that forcing the
organization to retain James Dale as an assistant scoutmaster,
after Dale had acknowledged he was gay, would “significantly
burden” 149 the Boy Scouts’ desire “to not promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior.” 150
As can be deduced from what I have written thus far, I
have only a small quarrel with the Court’s analysis in that
regard. It seems eminently reasonable to me that a group that
wishes to convey the message that homosexual behavior is
immoral, wrong and unacceptable would not want one of its
leaders to be a happy, well-adjusted and ordinary-seeming gay
person. My small quarrel with the Court’s analysis is that the
Boy Scouts failed to consistently and clearly convey such a
147
Indeed, I believe it is precisely because this argument has so consistently
failed that proponents of LGBT equality believe they must retreat to the position of
denying the existence of any burden on a possible constitutional right to begin with.
However, the same optimism that fuels my belief that the legal landscape will
ultimately change for LGBT people also makes me believe that courts will begin to
accept the compelling interest that government has in ensuring that LGBT people can
live lives of honesty and safety.
148
530 U.S. 640 (2000).
149
Id. at 659.
150
Id. at 653 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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message about homosexuality to its members. I have no
difficulty accepting an organization’s statement of its beliefs
and then deferring to that organization’s allegation that
engaging in certain conduct will undermine those beliefs.
Nevertheless, it does seem to me that the organization must
clearly state its beliefs and then conform its actions to those
beliefs in a logical fashion. The Boy Scouts’ position was
problematic on both fronts: first, the organization’s public
membership documents did not clearly state that
homosexuality was inconsistent with the Boy Scouts’ oath, and
second, the organization did not consistently remove
heterosexual scoutmasters who publicly stated that
homosexuality was acceptable. 151
But the fatal flaw in the Court’s Dale opinion, from my
perspective, is its failure to truly examine whether the burden
on the Boy Scouts was justified. This would have required,
first, a careful analysis of the State’s interest in prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation in order to
determine the importance of that interest. Next, it would have
required an analysis of whether refusing to include an
exemption in the law for entities whose expressive association
beliefs would thereby be burdened was “so far from being
commensurate with the individual interest as to be arbitrarily
or pointlessly applied.” 152
If that analysis had been done, and if the Court had
taken seriously the adverse impact on the identity liberty of
gay people when a government fails to protect them from
private discrimination, I believe the Court would have
appropriately determined that a group as large and as broadbased as the Boy Scouts should not have been granted an
exemption from the state law.
But the Court’s analysis in Dale regarding whether New
Jersey’s interests in protecting gay people justified its
burdening of the Boy Scouts’ expressive association rights was
neither thorough nor thoughtful.
The Court’s “analysis”
consisted of the following three sentences:
We have already concluded that a state requirement that the Boy
Scouts retain Dale as an assistant scoutmaster would significantly
burden the organization’s right to oppose or disfavor homosexual
conduct. The state interests embodied in New Jersey’s public
151
On the importance of the latter point, see Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating
the Public Sphere: Beyond the Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1611-13 (2001).
152
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 768 (Souter, J., concurring).
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accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the
Boy Scouts’ rights to freedom of expressive association. That being
the case, we hold that the First Amendment prohibits the State from
imposing such a requirement through the application of its public
accommodations law. 153

“That being the case?” The very lack of analysis in the
Court’s opinion—the simple reliance on these conclusory
words—was a slap in the face of gay people. 154
The plurality in the Georgetown case did a better job of
analyzing the compelling interest a government might have in
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation.
After delving extensively into the literature regarding sexual
orientation, as well as exploring the legislative history of the
D.C. Council’s ordinance, the plurality noted the following:
The Council determined that a person’s sexual orientation, like a
person’s race and sex, for example, tells nothing of value about his or
her attitudes, characteristics, abilities or limitations. It is a false
measure of individual worth, one unfair and oppressive to the person
concerned, one harmful to others because discrimination inflicts a
grave and recurring injury upon society as a whole. To put an end to
this evil, the Council outlawed sexual orientation discrimination in
employment, in real estate transactions, in public accommodations,
in educational institutions, and elsewhere. Such comprehensive
measures were necessary to ensure that “[e]very individual shall
have an equal opportunity to participate fully in the economic,
cultural and intellectual life of the District, and to have an equal
opportunity to participate in all aspects of life . . . .” 155

The plurality also invoked the majestic sweep of the
federal constitutional liberty interest in underscoring the
importance of a State interest in prohibiting discrimination
based on sexual orientation:
The compelling interests, therefore, that any state has in eradicating
discrimination against the homosexually or bisexually oriented
include the fostering of individual dignity, the creation of a climate
and environment in which each individual can utilize his or her
153

Boy Scouts of Am., 530 U.S. at 659 (emphasis added).
For additional cases finding that a civil rights law may not be applied in a
manner that burdens the religious beliefs of an individual or organization because of
the lack of a compelling state interest, see Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm’n,
165 F.3d 692, 716 (9th Cir. 1999), vacated, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) (no compelling
government interest in protecting unmarried, cohabiting heterosexual couples); Walker
v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church of San Francisco, No. 760-028, 1980 WL 4657,
at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 3, 1980) (interest of city of San Francisco in its gay rights
ordinance was not compelling).
155
Gay Rights Coalition of Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. v. Georgetown Univ.,
536 A.2d 1, 32 (1987) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
154
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potential to contribute to and benefit from society, and equal
protection of the life, liberty and property that the Founding Fathers
guaranteed to us all. 156

Ensuring that LGBT people can live honestly and safely in all
aspects of their social lives requires that society set a baseline
of non-discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation and
gender identity.
If individual business owners, service
providers and employers could easily exempt themselves from
such laws by making credible claims that their belief liberty is
burdened by the law, LGBT people would remain constantly
vulnerable to surprise discrimination. If I am denied a job, an
apartment, a room at a hotel, a table at a restaurant or a
procedure by a doctor because I am a lesbian, that is a deep,
intense and tangible hurt. That hurt is not alleviated because I
might be able to go down the street and get a job, an
apartment, a hotel room, a restaurant table or a medical
procedure from someone else. The assault to my dignity and
my sense of safety in the world occurs when the initial denial
happens. That assault is not mitigated by the fact that others
might not treat me in the same way. 157
Thus, for all my sympathy for the evangelical Christian
couple who may wish to run a bed and breakfast from which
they can exclude unmarried, straight couples and all gay
couples, this is a point where I believe the “zero-sum” nature of
the game inevitably comes into play. And, in making the
decision in this zero-sum game, I am convinced society should
come down on the side of protecting the liberty of LGBT people.
Once individuals choose to enter the stream of economic
commerce by opening commercial establishments, I believe it is
legitimate to require that they play by certain rules. 158 If the
156

Id. at 37.
As the court observed in Smith v. Fair Employment Housing Commission,
“[T]o permit Smith to discriminate would sacrifice the rights of her prospective tenants
to have equal access to public accommodations and their legal and dignity interests in
freedom from discrimination based on personal characteristics.” 913 P.2d 909, 925
(Cal. 1996). Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964)
(“the fundamental object of [federal civil rights legislation] was to vindicate ‘the
deprivation of personal dignity that surely accompanies denials of equal access to
public establishments.’” (quoting S. REP. NO. 872, at 16-17 (1964))).
158
A number of writers have made the argument that entering the stream of
commerce should legitimately subject an enterprise to civil rights laws. See, e.g., Mark
Hager, Freedom of Solidarity: Why the Boy Scout Case Was Rightly (But Wrongly)
Decided, 35 CONN L. REV. 129, 157 (2002) (contending that “[o]rganizations engaged in
commerce should not be cloaked with fundamental or First Amendment freedom to
exclude members on any bases they see fit”); Maureen E. Markey, The
Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-RFRA World, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 487,
157
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government tolerated the private exclusionary policies of such
individuals in the commercial sector, such toleration would
necessarily come at the cost of gay people’s sense of belonging
and safety in society. Just as we do not tolerate private racial
beliefs that adversely affect African-Americans in the
commercial arena, even if such beliefs are based on religious
views, we should similarly not tolerate private beliefs about
sexual orientation and gender identity that adversely affect
LGBT people. 159
But that is not to say that we should not acknowledge
that this zero-sum game has resulted in a burden on some
individuals’ belief liberty and that we not be forced to
articulate why such a burden is appropriate. A government’s
reasons for burdening liberty should be, as Professor Rebecca
Brown argues, “accessible to all in a meaningful sense.” 160
Brown defines these as reasons that “have some public and
secular component to them and [do] not rest entirely on
personal moral belief systems not universally shared.” 161 While
I am not sure I would use Brown’s formulation of a “personal
moral belief system[] not universally shared,” I do believe that
the reasons given by the State must “reflect the public good.” 162
And ensuring that members of the public who have a morally
neutral characteristic are able to live without fear or
vulnerability of discrimination based on that characteristic
certainly seems to be a reason that reflects the public good.
The question remains, however, whether there are
limited situations in which a legislature should choose to
protect the belief liberty of individuals or institutions over the
549-52 (1998) (suggesting that the government need not show a compelling state
interest test for anti-discrimination laws in free exercise cases in which religious
people have engaged in voluntary commercial activity); Wessels, supra note 4, at 1231
(urging protection for religious groups from civil rights laws when the group looks
“inward” to itself as a religious community, but not when the group “turns outwards” in
providing services to others in the community).
159
For cases finding that the government interest in prohibiting racial
discrimination was sufficiently compelling to justify a burden on religious beliefs, see
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Newman v. Piggie Park Enters.,
256 F. Supp. 941 (D.S.C. 1966), rev’d, 377 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967), aff’d, 390 U.S. 400
(1968).
160
Brown, supra note 61, at 1547.
161
Id.
162
Id. Brown draws significantly on the work of political theorists to argue
that “[a] major contribution of deliberative democracy theory to constitutional theory is
its insight that a commitment to equality of all citizens gives rise to an obligation to
justify laws with reasons that are accessible to all.” Id. at 1548 (citing LAWRENCE C.
BECKER, RECIPROCITY 73-144
(1986); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON,
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT 55-59, 65, 84-85 & 377 n.43 (1996)).
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interest in protecting the safety and dignity of LGBT people. I
believe there are two situations that are worth exploring.
As a general matter, once a religious person or
institution enters the stream of commerce by operating an
enterprise such as a doctor’s office, hospital, bookstore, hotel,
treatment center and so on, I believe the enterprise must
adhere to a norm of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation and gender identity. This is essential so that an
individual who happens upon the enterprise is not surprised by
a denial of service and/or a directive to go down the street to a
different provider. While I was initially drawn to the idea of
providing an exemption to those enterprises that advertise
solely in very limited milieus (such as the bed and breakfast
that advertises only on Christian Web sites), I became wary of
such an approach as a practical matter. The touchstone needs
to be, I believe, whether LGBT people would be made
vulnerable in too many locations across society.
An
“advertising exception” seemed potentially subject to
significant abuse.
Nevertheless, I believe there might be a more limited
exception that would be justified. There are enterprises that
are engaged in by belief communities (almost always religious
belief communities) that are specifically designed to inculcate
values in the next generation. These may include schools, day
care centers, summer camps and tours. These enterprises are
sometimes for-profit and sometimes not-for-profit. They are
within the general stream of commerce, together with many
other schools, day care centers, summer camps and tours.
I believe a subset of these enterprises present a
compelling case for the legislature to provide an exemption in a
law mandating non-discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The criteria for an exemption should be as follows: the
enterprise must present itself clearly and explicitly as designed
to inculcate a set of beliefs; the beliefs of the enterprise must be
clearly set forth as being inconsistent with a belief that
homosexuality is morally neutral and the enterprise must seek
to enroll only individuals who wish to be inculcated with such
beliefs.
The dignity of LGBT individuals would still be harmed
by excluding such enterprises from the purview of an antidiscrimination law. But in weighing the interests between the
groups, I believe the harm to the enterprise in having its
inculcation of values to its members significantly hampered (as
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I believe it would be if it was forced to comply with such a law)
outweighs the harm to the excluded LGBT members.
I am more hesitant regarding the second limited
circumstance, but I offer it for analysis and criticism. 163 I
believe there may be a legitimate exemption that should be
provided with regard to leadership positions in enterprises that
are more broadly represented in commerce. Many religious
institutions operate the gamut of social services in the
community, such as hospitals, gyms, adoption agencies and
drug treatment centers. These enterprises are open and
marketed to the general public and often receive governmental
funds.
It seems quite appropriate to require that the
enterprises’ services be delivered without regard to sexual
orientation and that most employment positions in these
enterprises be available without regard to sexual orientation.
But the balance of interests, it seems to me, shifts with
regard to the leadership positions in such enterprises.
Particularly for religiously-affiliated institutions, I believe it is
important that people in leadership positions be able to
articulate the beliefs and values of the enterprise. If the
identity and practice of an openly gay person will stand in
direct contradiction to those beliefs and values, it seems to me
that the enterprise suffers a significant harm. Thus, in this
limited circumstance, a legislature may perhaps legitimately
conclude that the harm to the enterprise will be greater than
the harm to the particular individuals excluded from such
positions and provide a narrow exemption from a nondiscrimination mandate in employment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

In his response to my article, Andy Koppelman correctly
observes that my suggestions are radical. 164 Calling for judicial
and legislative acknowledgment of a “belief liberty” that
encompasses any sincerely held core belief can indeed be

163
My thoughts in this area are shaped by the thirteen years that I
represented Catholic Charities USA (from 1993 through 2006) in the federal legislative
arena as Director of the Federal Legislation Clinic at Georgetown University Law
Center.
164
See Andrew Koppelman, You Can’t Hurry Love: Why Antidiscrimination
Protections for Gay People Should Have Religious Exemptions, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 125
(2006).
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viewed as a radical departure from the more traditional focus
on just religiously based beliefs. 165
As I hope my analysis has made clear, however, such an
acknowledgement need not bring the mechanisms of our
complex society to a screeching halt. For a court to invalidate a
law based on its burdening of belief liberty, the court must first
find that the legislature could not have legitimately enacted
the law as a “reasonable resolution of contending values.” 166 By
contrast, a legislature is permitted greater latitude and greater
responsibility to consider and weigh these contending values
when it enacts legislation in the first place—exactly as it
should be in a democratic process.
My primary argument is that we gain something as a
society if we acknowledge that a law requiring individuals to
act in a certain way might burden some individuals’ belief
liberty. Such an acknowledgement is necessary if we wish to
be respectful of the whole person. Protecting one group’s
identity liberty may, at times, require that we burden others’
belief liberty. This is an inherent and irreconcilable reality of
our complex society. But I would rather live in a society where
we acknowledge that conflict openly, and where we engage in
an honest dialogue about what accommodations might be
possible given that reality, than to live in a society where we
pretend the conflict does not exist in the first place.
But in dealing with this conflict, I believe it is essential
that we not privilege moral beliefs that are religiously based
over other sincerely held core, moral beliefs. Laws passed
pursuant to public policies may burden the belief liberty of
those who adhere to either religious or secular beliefs. What
seems of paramount importance to me is that we respect these
core beliefs and do the best we can in this imperfect world of
ours to protect both identity liberty and belief liberty to the
greatest extent possible.

165
As Koppelman observes, however, some members of the Supreme Court
have, at times, been quite expansive with what they consider to be a “religiously based”
belief. See Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
166
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 768 (Souter, J., concurring).

